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Abstract 
 
This thesis is composed of three essays on the market perception to strategy change 
announcements. Specifically, it tries to investigate the market reaction around the 
strategy change announcement date and these event firms’ pre-announcement and 
long-term performance. It also focuses on the content analysis of FACTIVA news and 
analyst reports that are about the strategy changes.   
 
Chapter Two shows that in line with the need for new strategies, firms with strategy 
change announcements have higher debt, less cash, worse operating performance, 
lower market expectations while still exhibit higher growth prospects, make higher 
investment and have higher R&D relative to publicly listed matched firms. This 
chapter also finds that strategy change announcements are associated with positive 
short-term abnormal returns. This suggests that market perceives the announcement 
as good news for the firms’ long-term development. Further at one-year after the 
announcement date, event firms exhibit better operating performance, potential long-
term growth prospects, improved liquidity and are less leveraged. 
 
In Chapter Three, my findings show that higher occurrence of positive (negative) 
words in FACTIVA news are associated with more positive (negative) short-term 
stock performance. Furthermore, the effects of negative tones are greater relative to 
positive tones, especially when strategy change announcements are less informative. 
Increasing weights in positive (negative) tones are associated with higher (lower) 
abnormal returns. When comparing FACTIVA news with the subsequent annual 
reports, positive tones exhibit similar market reaction while negative words in annual 
reports tend to have higher market impact. 
 
Chapter Four finds that higher occurrence of positive (negative) words in analyst 
reports exhibit more positive (negative) stock returns. In fact, the market responds 
more strongly to negative tones compared to positive tones in analyst reports. 
Increasing weights in negative words are associated with more negative stock 
performance. This suggests that analysts are particularly important in propagating the 
potential risks and challenges related to the strategy changes. Furthermore, this chapter 
shows that market participants pay more attention to positive tones in analyst reports 
when strategy change announcements are more informative or supplemented with 
more forward-looking statements. In contrast, market participants focus more on 
negative tones when firms do not disclose adequate useful information to the public. 
In addition, positive (negative) tones in analyst reports are associated with more 
positive (negative) market reaction relative to annual reports. 
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Chapter One 
General Introduction  
 
The thesis consists of three essays on strategy change announcements. Strategy change 
announcements mean that firms refine their current strategies to change their operating 
direction (i.e, major changes) or make different strategies that were not included in the 
current strategies (i.e., new strategies). The new strategies provide a new direction of 
firms’ long-term operations. The content of strategy change announcements includes: 
new market that the event firms trying to expand; new approaches to compete or 
maintain leadership; new products or services the event firms want to launch; the 
reasons for collaborating with new strategic partners; new involvement with e-
commerce and other firm specific strategies that introduced by the event firms. 
Therefore, Chapter Two investigates potential reasons for strategic changes and the 
short-term market reaction to strategy change announcements. Chapter Three analyse 
the effects of positive and negative words in FACTIVA news on stock price movement 
around the strategy change announcement date. Chapter Four alternatively study the 
impact of the content of analyst reports on stock reactions around the strategy change 
announcement date.  
 
Strategy is a crucial plan for firms’ long-term operation and development. It provides 
a sense of direction and creates a unifying vision for the whole organization. For 
example, a clear and explicit strategy communicates the short-term and long-term 
objectives to employees. Strategies also helps firms to provide superior goods and 
services than their competitors (Porter, 1996). However, firms are not likely to 
implement the same set of strategies due to the changes in business environment such 
as market demand, consumer tastes, competitive environment, technologies, and 
regulations. Firms have to anticipate and respond to these changes. Nevertheless, the 
literature on strategies so far has focused on the importance of a good strategic 
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decision and the implementation of strategies. Evidence concerning potential reasons 
for strategic changes and the corresponding market reaction to strategy change 
announcements are limited in the literature.  
 
In Chapter Two, I focus on firms’ characteristics when announcing changed/new 
strategies and their stock performance around the strategy change announcement date. 
In the aim of maximising shareholders’ wealth and being competitive in the industry, 
managers periodically review their firms’ operating performance (Johnson and 
Scholes, 2002; Middleton, 2003; Rumelt, 2011). If managers figure out problems in 
terms of poor operating performance, they may be incentivized to change their current 
strategies or introduce new strategies to preserve their firms’ high growth potential. 
When announcing changed/new strategies, confident managers may disclose in details 
firms’ new products/service and the direction and steps in terms of how to advertise 
their new products/service, expand in the current market or explore a new market to 
be competitive with their rival firms (Porter, 1996). These changed/new detailed 
strategies would provide positive signals to market participants and help firms to 
improve their performance in the long-term. 
 
Empirically, I find that firms with strategy change announcements exhibit worse 
operating performance, lower market expectations, higher financial distress risk but 
have higher growth prospects. They are also associated with positive abnormal returns 
around the announcement date. It suggests that market participants consider these 
changed/new strategies as good signals of being competitive. In the long-term, I 
further find that these firms exhibit better operating performance, improved liquidity 
and are less leveraged. At the same time, they have high long-term growth potential 
and promote innovation on products and services. It indicates that after changing the 
current strategies or announcing a new strategy, firms are able to efficiently allocate 
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their resources and expand in the current/new markets by introducing new products or 
services. 
 
To my best knowledge my study is the first attempt systematically to analyse the 
market price impact of strategy change announcements in detail. My second 
contribution describes how firms report new strategies if the market is critical of their 
current strategies. Firms attempt to signal change of the current inefficient “bad” 
strategies to “good” strategies with the purpose of increasing the firms’ competitive 
advantages in terms of attracting more businesses, creating future investment 
opportunities or reducing competition. 
 
It is easy for market participants to communicate by estimating quantitative 
information such as accounting variables. Nevertheless, only incorporating 
quantitative information alone is not enough to explain stock price movements since 
firms also release qualitative information to the market. Market participants in the real 
world tend to analyse stock price reaction using both quantitative and qualitative 
information. In other words, qualitative information has its irreplaceable value for 
market participants. The literature so far has conducted content analysis on qualitative 
information obtained from annual reports (Feldman，Govindraj, Livnat and Segal, 
2010), news (Dougal et al., 2012), earnings conference calls (Mayew and 
Venkatachalam, 2012) and IPOs (Loughran and McDonald, 2013) but overlooked an 
important source of valuable qualitative information, strategy change announcements, 
which contain management’s belief about the firms’ future and management’s 
intended actions to reallocate companies’ resources. More interestingly, the extent of 
information disclosure is under the discretion of the management. The quality of the 
information disclosure can influence the firms’ returns. Despite of its importance and 
relevance, there is very little empirical evidence concerning the content of strategy 
change announcements and its associated impact on stock returns.  
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Chapter Three investigates the impact of tones in FACTIVA news on stock market 
reactions around the strategy change announcement date. This question is triggered 
from different types of available public information. In addition to publicly disclosed 
accounting variables, qualitative information may also provide incremental powers for 
explaining stock prices (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 
2013). One important type of qualitative information is FACTIVA news about strategy 
change announcements which includes firms’ new direction in short-term and long-
term investments (Middleton, 2003). Furthermore, confident managers may provide 
detailed strategic implementation processes which represent firms’ attempt to be more 
competitive and thus may enhance the firm value. In contrast, the less informative 
strategy change announcements only provide a list of new goals without further 
explaining the approaches to achieve them. Chapter Three tests whether confident 
managers actually provide more relevant (price sensitive) information. 
 
I find using a sophisticated content analysis approach that the relative strength of the 
positive (negative) words used in news reports about the firms’ strategy change 
announcements leads to more positive (negative) stock performance. The positive 
effects are stronger when strategy change announcements are more informative, while 
the negative impacts are stronger for less informative announcements. Further, 
increasing occurrence of positive (negative) words is associated with rising (dropping) 
abnormal returns. These findings suggest that market participants generally consider 
bad news as more credible, while good news requires more verifiable forward-looking 
information to support (Hutton et al., 2003). In addition, I compare tone in FACTIVA 
news versus that in firm annual reports and find similar effects in terms of positive 
weight power. Nevertheless, greater occurrence of negative words in annual reports is 
likely to have more negative stock reactions. One possible explanation is that firms 
are very likely to report positive information in their annual reports. Firms may 
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disclose negative information in the annual reports only when it is inevitable and thus 
market participants consider this negative information extra seriously. 
 
My main contribution to the literature is to show that the content of strategy change 
announcements is important in explaining associated stock movements and thus 
extends our understanding of the importance of qualitative information to market 
participants. An important general contribution to the wider strategy literature I make 
is to highlight how firms can increase their market value by announcing new strategies 
(whether or not this is actually implemented in practice). 
 
Analyst reports are a useful source of information that contains quantitative summary 
measures, including earnings forecasts, stock recommendation and target prices. 
Analyst reports also contain useful soft and non-financial qualitative information 
about companies’ business strategies, effectiveness of their management, risk 
exposure and competitiveness against their peer firms (Breton and Taffler, 2001). 
Institutional and individual investors rely on both quantitative and qualitative 
information of analyst reports when making financial decisions. Tsao (2002) points 
out that the price targets and stock ratings (i.e., quantitative information) are the skin 
and bones of analysts’ research, while detail and tone (i.e., qualitative information) are 
the meat of such reports. In reality, despite the fact that analysts’ quantitative outputs 
are available on databases (e.g., I/B/E/S), market participants still expend vast 
amounts of their money in accessing the full content of analyst reports. Therefore, 
qualitative information is also very important to market participants. Nevertheless, the 
existing literature focuses almost exclusively on quantitative information and 
overlooks the qualitative information of the analysts’ reports. The disproportion 
between quantitative and qualitative information studies may prevent the literature 
from developing a more comprehensive understanding of analysts’ role (Bradshaw, 
2011).   
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In Chapter Four, the aim is to analyse the impact of the content of analyst reports on 
stock price movement around the strategy change announcement date. It is triggered 
by different information in terms of strategy change announcements included in 
managers’ discretionary disclosures versus analyst reports. The former one is 
managers’ voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Hirst et al., 1999; Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000; Bens and Monahan, 2004) and managers may be less incentivized 
to include all information when they do not have detailed plan to implement their 
strategies. In contrast, analysts are experts and can estimate their superior firm and 
industry information to provide a valuable estimation of firms’ performance after the 
announcement date. Chapter Four tests whether market participants consider 
information in analyst reports about strategic changes as more credible and useful for 
making financial decisions than that provided by firm managers.  
 
In my parallel analysis of analyst reports I find that the greater the occurrence of 
positive (negative) words, the more positive (negative) is abnormal stock performance. 
At the same time, the impact of negative words is stronger relative to that of positive 
words with only the relationship between increasing weights of negative words and 
decreasing abnormal returns is significant. This suggests that market participants may 
consider negative analyst reports as more credible. In parallel, positive reports are 
viewed as less reliable compared to negative ones as positive news is already disclosed 
by firm managers. Furthermore, I show that higher occurrence of positive words in 
analyst reports is associated with more positive abnormal returns when strategy 
change announcements are more informative. In contrast, for less informative 
announcements, higher frequency of negative words is associated with more negative 
abnormal returns. In addition, this chapter shows that positive (negative) words in 
analyst reports have a more positive (negative) effect on stock returns relative to 
strategy change news and firm annual reports. This finding provides evidence to show 
that market participants pay more attention to credible analyst reports relative to firm 
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disclosures in annual reports, where the latter represents information disclosed by 
managers voluntarily. 
 
My main contribution to the literature is to show that in addition to accounting 
variables and FACTIVA news, analyst reports are an important source in explaining 
stock price movements. A vital general contribution to the wider strategy literature is 
to highlight that analyst reports are more credible relative to FACTIVA news and 
firms’ annual reports. My analysis also contributes to the recent empirical literature 
that explores the information content of qualitative information and its impact on stock 
market reaction (Antweiler and Frank 2004; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008).  
 
Finally, Chapter Five concludes the findings in the thesis and discusses possible future 
research. 
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Chapter Two 
Market Reaction to Strategy Change 
Announcements 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Strategy is a crucial plan for companies’ operation and development. It provides a 
sense of direction and creates a unifying vision for the whole organisation. For 
example, a clear and explicit strategy communicates the short-term and long-term 
objectives to employees. Strategy also helps firms to provide superior goods and 
services than their competitors (Porter, 1996). However, firms are not likely to 
implement the same set of strategies due to the changes in market environment such 
as market demand, consumer tastes, competitive environment, technology, and 
regulations. Firms have to anticipate and respond to these changes. Nevertheless, the 
literature on strategy so far has focused on the importance of good strategic decisions 
and the implementation of strategies. Evidence concerning potential reasons for 
changes in strategies and the corresponding market reaction to strategy change 
announcements are limited in the literature.  
 
To examine companies’ response to changes in business environment, this chapter 
aims to investigate characteristics of the firms that announce changes in their current 
strategies or new strategic decisions (i.e., event firms). The changed/new strategies 
include expansion into new markets, changes in suppliers or raw materials and 
development of new products or services. Further, I analyse these firms’ stock 
performance around the strategy change announcement date. 
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This chapter first analyses firms’ motivations to change their strategies. To maximise 
shareholders’ wealth and be competitive in the industry, managers periodically review 
their firms’ operating performance (Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Middleton, 2003; 
Rumelt, 2011). If firms do not efficiently allocate their resources, their products and 
services would not be competitive or attractive in the market and their managers might 
figure out the problems in terms of poor operating performance and financial weakness. 
At the same time, these firms still have high growth prospects and might increase their 
capital expenditures and research and development (R&D) expenses on innovating 
new products/services, expanding their current market shares or exploring new 
markets (Middleton, 2003). They might be motivated to change their strategic 
decisions so that new products/services are competitive and growth options are 
preserved. As a result, I conjecture that event firms exhibit worse operating 
performance but have higher growth options, capital expenditures and R&D expenses 
before their strategy change announcements relative to matched publicly listed firms 
that do not have changed/new strategies.  
 
In this chapter, I examine a sample of 124 U.S. firms with strategy change 
announcements during the 2010 to 2012 period. These firms have at least one major 
change in their strategies during the sample period and I consider the earliest releasing 
date as the strategy change announcement date. My results show that before strategy 
change announcements, event firms have higher leverage ratio (i.e., higher financial 
distress risks), worse operating performance, lower market expectations but relatively 
higher growth prospects when compared to matched firms. Consequently, their 
strategy changes tend to focus on increasing the overall expenditures, especially on 
the research and development (R&D), to improve their product and service innovation. 
 
Next, I explore market participants’ reaction to the announcement of changed/new 
strategies. The announcement includes detailed description of firms’ new products or 
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services so that firms can distinguish their products/services with their rival firms 
(Porter, 1996). The changed/new strategies may also provide firms the direction and 
steps in terms of how to advertise their new products/service, expand in the current 
market or explore a new market. Market participants thus can realize the potential 
benefits related to the changed/new strategies and I conjecture that they react 
positively after the announcement date. My analysis confirms the market’s recognition 
and shows that firms with strategy change announcements have significantly positive 
stock performance around the strategy change announcement dates. These results are 
consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Bagnoli et al., 2005a; 2005b), which shows 
that the market is slow in absorbing strategic information.  
 
Further, I address whether the changed/new strategies improve firms’ operating 
performance in the long-term period. After changing the current strategies or 
announcing a new strategy, firms are able to efficiently allocate their resources and 
expand in the current/new markets by introducing new products or service. As a result, 
event firms are more likely to be profitable. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that 
firms with changed/new strategies exhibit better financial and operating performance 
in the long run.  
 
My study contributes to several strands of literature. First, my analysis extends the 
existing empirical literature on strategy in a general level. Prior literature focuses on 
what is a good strategy and how to implement an effective strategy in a particular 
industry. Previous studies show that strategic actions and communication of strategies 
(e.g., CEO speeches or annual reports) affect the company reputation. Firms prefer a 
good reputation which helps to attract more businesses and leads to higher commercial 
benefits (Ferguson et al., 2000; Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004). Jones et al. (2004) find 
a favourable market reaction to investments that “create” future investment 
opportunities. Neuhierl et al. (2013) find strong market responses to news related to 
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corporate strategies, legal issues, customers and partners. Whittington et al. (2010) 
show that the market considers strategic plan announcement as more than “just talk” 
since the announcement can reduce competition in an industry that requires large 
investment or with huge sunk costs. My contribution is being the first one that analyses 
strategy change announcements.  
 
My second contribution is to show that firms tend to change their strategies if current 
strategies do not provide efficient directions in their operations. It helps to transfer the 
existing inefficient “bad” strategy to a “good” strategy which can increase firms’ 
competitive advantages in terms of attracting more businesses, creating future 
investment opportunities or reducing competition. After the strategy change 
announcement date, the market reacts positively and firms also improve their 
competitive advantages in the form of better operating performance.  
      
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 summarises the 
related literature. Section 2.3 explains the research questions and the economic 
intuition for my four main hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the data, explains the data 
collection process and the methodology. Section 2.5 reports the empirical results and 
Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter mainly focuses on firms that have changed their current strategies or 
made a new strategic decision. Nevertheless, current literature discusses the 
announcement of strategies in a general level through using a qualitative approach. 
Most of current papers investigate what is a (good) strategy and how to implement a 
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strategic decision. In this session, I provide a summary of previous studies and try to 
link the importance of strategic decisions with the importance of changing/new 
strategies. 
 
First, Porter (1996) shows that a competitive strategy makes firms different from their 
rival firms. To be competitive, insight and creativity is required in terms of firms’ 
strategic positioning. Firms can offer goods/services that are not provided by the rival 
companies or similar goods/services with rival firms but in different ways. In other 
words, firms prudently select a different set of activities to achieve product 
differentiation and to provide customers with a unique mix of values. This suggests 
that firms change their current strategies with insights and creativity when their current 
strategies are not competitive relative to their rival firms. 
 
In addition to differentiating from rival firms, strategy is a long-term plan for obtaining 
profitability. Strategy is a statement that coherently combines all sort of actions and 
policies to overcome high-stakes challenges, maximise shareholders’ wealth and meet 
the market requirement (Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Rumelt, 2011). In order to 
overcome the high-stake challenges, Middleton (2003) states that firms with good 
strategies deepen their understanding of the present situation and establish the 
direction and implementation steps to achieve a desired and achievable future position. 
If firms’ current strategies have obstacles in obtaining the long-term profitability, they 
tend to change their strategies or make a new one. As a result, these firms can 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, meet customers’ requirement and are competitive.   
 
Announcing changed/new strategies is a voluntarily disclosure and aims to build a 
competitive and profitable firm. The Voluntary disclosure indicates that firms’ 
management voluntarily provides information to the public beyond the requirements 
of the SEC and GAAP (Meek et al., 1995). At the same time, disclosing the 
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changed/new strategic plans might reveal private information to firms’ competitors. 
Therefore, next, I summarize benefits of the voluntarily disclosure in the form of 
enhancing firm value and positive market reaction. The following listed papers 
provide evidence to show that benefits can overweight costs.  
 
Investors make decisions by considering the voluntary disclosed information because 
they connect the credibility of voluntary disclosure with firms’ management 
credibility which suggests the level of managers’ trustworthiness and competence 
(Molly, 2004). Investors consider firms’ financial and other disclosures as more 
credible when the credibility of voluntary disclosure is high. The previous literature 
shows that combining the credible management with the informative voluntary 
disclosure can greatly enhance firm value. Botosan (1997), Hirst et al. (1999), Lang 
and Lundholm (2000) and Bens and Monahan (2004) show that the level of 
discretionary disclosure can be a proxy of the management credibility. High level of 
discretionary disclosure provides a monitoring role of firms’ managers, mitigates the 
information asymmetry between the management and investors and thus reduces the 
agency costs. Furthermore, investors consider the management’s subsequent 
disclosures as more reliable when managers present accurate disclosure and forecast 
at an earlier time period.  
 
A larger amount of discretionary disclosure by firms’ management is associated with 
a lower cost of capital and higher stock performance. When managers plan a particular 
strategic decision (including changing the current strategies or making a new one) and 
persuade stakeholders to invest, they tend to voluntarily disclose their private 
information about the corporate strategies (Ferreira and Rezende, 2007). The private 
information is reliable since managers are concerned with their reputation and 
credibility. This reliable voluntary disclosure is likely to exhibit a positive market 
reaction. The previous papers do not investigate the effect of strategy change 
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announcements on stock prices but they provide evidence to support the positive 
correlation between management’s voluntary disclosure of other qualitative 
information and the stock market reaction. Bagnoli et al. (2005a; 2005b) analyse 
different corporate information events, including conference calls, press interviews, 
managements’ disclosure of strategic decisions and future financial performance 
estimations. They find larger market reaction in response to the quantitative earnings 
guidance relative to the release of corporate qualitative information events. The market 
also tends to react slowly to the qualitative information relative to the quantitative 
information.  
 
Neuhierl et al. (2010) analyse corporate press releases issued by U.S. publicly listed 
companies from 2006 to 2009 and find a strong market reaction to news related to 
corporate strategies, legal issues, customers and partners. In particular, they document 
that firms’ liquidity decreases while returns’ volatility increases in the month 
subsequent to the announcement date. During the financial crisis, news that indicates 
more stable and increasing future cash flows (e.g., announcements about new 
corporate partners, corporate restructuring, successful research completion, legal 
settlements and FDA approvals) is associated with more positive market reaction. 
Events that signal higher uncertainty and smaller future cash flows (e.g., 
announcements about FDA rejections, failed research efforts and legal troubles) could 
trigger a larger negative effect on stock prices. 
 
Whittington et al. (2010) show that the market considers strategic plan announcements 
by U.S. publicly listed companies as more than “just talk” or “cheap talk”. The 
announcement can reduce competitiveness in an industry that requires large 
investments or is with huge sunk costs. The announcement signals clear intentions to 
the firms’ competitors and thus may discourage new entrants. Whittington et al. (2010) 
also show that new chief executive officers are more likely to enhance the impact of 
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positively evaluated strategic plan announcements. Discourse in the new CEOs’ letters 
materially impact on the recommendations by financial analysts and the firms’ 
capacity to acquire external resources.  
 
 
 
2.3. Hypotheses  
 
The main aim of the paper is to investigate why firms change their current strategies 
or announce a new strategic decision, the market’s perception and the long-term 
operating performance to the announcements. The literature up to date mentioned in 
Section 2.2 focuses on the importance of strategies, including the competitive 
advantages, shareholder wealth maximization and management monitoring, but does 
not provide any direct arguments for the importance of changing/new strategies. 
Therefore, I provide four different hypotheses on strategy change announcements in 
this section. 
 
Managers meet periodically and review firms’ operating performance to maximise 
shareholder wealth and survive in the competitive market environment (Middleton, 
2003). In the meetings, managers figure out their competitive advantages and 
disadvantages. To meet the market’s requirement and thus be competitive, managers 
are eager to make sure that firms’ resources, products and services are efficiently 
allocated (Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Rumelt, 2011). When resources are 
inefficiently allocated or products and services do not meet the market’s requirement, 
firms would exhibit worse operating or/and stock performance. These firms are under 
the condition of uncompetitive and facing more challenges. At the same time, they 
still have long-term growth prospects. In order to keep the growth potential, firms’ 
managers have intentions to make adjustments to their current strategies or make a 
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completely new strategy. The changed/new strategies are able to direct firms to 
coherently combine all sorts of actions and policies in the long-term period. Therefore, 
I conjecture that firms with strategy change announcements are more likely to have 
worse operating performance but still have growth potential. At the same time, less 
favourable operating performance tends to be associated with financial weaknesses, 
including low liquidity and high leverage. To summarise, my first hypothesis posits: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with strategic change announcements exhibit worse operating 
performance, face financial weakness but have higher growth prospects.  
 
The changed/new strategies provide direction and steps for firms to deliver from the 
present uncompetitive position to their more desired future competitive position 
(Middleton, 2003). In addition to more investments in new projects, firms tend to 
increase innovations in creating new products or better services. The high innovation 
is important for firms to obtain their long-term future profitability. At the same time, 
these changed/new strategies can signal clear intentions to competitors and thus can 
deter new entrants, especially for the industries with huge sunk costs, such as capital 
investment and R&D (Whittington et al., 2010). Therefore, my second hypothesis is 
summarized as: 
Hypothesis 2: Event firms have higher capital expenditures and capital investment to 
create new products or improve their services before the strategy change 
announcement date. 
 
Firms announce to change their current strategies or provide a new strategy mean that 
managers have realized their problems in terms of worse operating performance and 
financial weakness. The changed/new strategies allow firms to provide goods/services 
that their rival firms do not offer or provide similar goods/services in a different 
manner (Porter, 1996). The main purpose is to maximize shareholders’ wealth and 
meet the market requirement (Johnson and Scholes, 2002). Therefore, I argue that after 
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observing the potential benefits of the changed/new strategies, market participants are 
likely to perceive firms with strategy change announcements as more competitive and 
have positive reactions. I summarize my third hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 3: Event firms have better stock performance around the strategy change 
announcement date. 
 
My first hypothesis stipulates that firms change their current strategies or directly 
provide a new strategy to efficiently allocate their resources and provide competitive 
products and services to their customers (Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Rumelt, 2011). 
Therefore, firms are able to overcome their problems in terms of financial weakness, 
keep their potential growth and exhibit good long-term operating performance. Also, 
the changed/new strategies provide firms with the direction of how to operate in the 
long-term. Overall, my fourth hypothesis posits that: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms have better long-term operating performance and are less 
leveraged after the strategy change announcement date. 
 
 
 
2.4. Data and Methodology  
 
Firms could use one set of strategies for some years or change part of its current 
strategies or refine its current strategies to change its operating direction (i.e, major 
changes) or make different strategies that were not included in the current strategies 
and provide a new direction of firms’ long-term operations (i.e., new strategies). The 
content of strategy change announcements includes: new market that the event firms 
trying to expand; new approaches to compete or maintain leadership; new products or 
services that the event firms plan to launch; reasons for collaborating with new 
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strategic partners; new involvement with e-commerce and other firm specific 
strategies that introduced by the event firms.  
 
In the chapter, the sample only includes firms that made public announcements about 
a new strategy or major refinements in their current strategies from 1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2012. The event firms are headquartered in the U.S. and are listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. The strategic information of firms is manually collected 
from FACTIVA and EDGAR by searching keywords such as “new* … strateg*”, 
“chang* … strateg*”, “modif* …strateg*”, “alter* …strateg*” and “amend* … 
strateg*”. The “*” in the keywords allows to search for the root of a word followed by 
one or more characters. At the same time, keywords are searched at a maximum of 5 
words apart in FACTIVA. Some firms may have more than one FACTIVA news about 
a strategy change announcement. This chapter only includes news in the earliest date 
as the announcement date and removes the remaining ones. In line with the literature 
(e.g. Hoberg et al., 2014), I further exclude firms with SIC code in the range of 4900-
4949 (utility firms) and 6000-6999 (financial institutions).  
 
To meet these criteria, I first hand collect 358 firms with U.S. headquarters. Private 
firms are deleted due to unavailable information of stock prices. Public firms that have 
missing data are also deleted. I also exclude firms that have a plan of mergers and 
acquisitions in their changed/new strategic decisions. Therefore, 234 firms are deleted 
and the final sample size includes 124 event firms.  
 
Next, to compare firm characteristics, firms are matched with publicly listed firms that 
have available accounting and stock price data in COMPUSTAT and CRSP but do not 
make strategy change announcements over the period from 2010 to 2012. Furthermore, 
event and matched firms are in the same Fama-French 12 industry and have the closest 
size (total assets) in the same fiscal year.  
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This chapter employs the conventional event study methodology by Kothari and 
Warner (2007). t = 0 denotes the event announcement date and the unexpected return 
is expressed as eit for firm i. The difference between the raw return (Rit) and the 
expected return (Kit), eit = Rit – Kit, measures the change in stockholders’ wealth due 
to the strategy change announcement. S&P500 daily market returns from DataStream 
are used as the expected returns. The cross-sectional average abnormal return (AR) at 
date t is calculated using the following equation: 
                                                           AAR𝑡 = 

N
i
ite
N 1
1
                                                      (2.1) 
Where AARt is used to test how prices respond to the strategy change announcement. 
To measure the market reaction over a multi-period interval, the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) from time t1 to t2 for firm i is calculated using the following equation: 
                                                      CAR𝑖(t1, t2) = 

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t
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Further, the average CAR across n firms over the time interval (t1, t2) is given by: 
                                               𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(t1, t2) =  
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                                      (2.3) 
 
 
 
2.5. Summary Statistics and Findings  
 
This section includes summary statistics of 124 event firms’ main characteristics at 
one accounting year before the strategy change announcement date and the regression 
results by testing the four hypotheses proposed in Section 2.3. In Tables 2.1 to 2.9, all 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize potential detrimental 
effect of outliers. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 2.7.  
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2.5.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2.1 presents the main characteristics for the 124 event firms before the strategy 
change announcement date. For comparison, we also report the summary statistics for 
their corresponding control firms matched by industry and total assets. The most 
striking feature in Table 2.1 is that event firms have significantly lower current and 
cash ratios when compared to those of matched firms (2.176 versus 2.865 and 1.054 
versus 1.454), which suggests that event firms have lower cash holdings and smaller 
current assets before announcing their changed/new strategies. In addition, event firms 
have significantly higher debt ratios (0.588 versus 0.446) and lower Z-scores (1.863 
versus 3.460), which suggests that these firms are highly levered and have higher 
financial distress risk. Further, event firms have smaller capital expenditure relative to 
their total assets. There is no other economically or statistically significant difference 
between any other firm characteristics including total assets, EBIT to total assets, sales 
growth, earnings per share, price to book, research and development over total assets, 
change in R&D and change in capital expenditure. 
 
- Insert Table 2.1 about here - 
 
Overall, my findings indicate that firms with strategy change announcements exhibit 
lower cash holdings, have smaller current assets and capital expenditures and are 
highly leveraged. 
 
2.5.2. Event Firm Characteristics 
 
To analyse characteristics of the event firms, Tables 2.2 to 2.5 report the results of 
logistic regressions. The dependent variable equals to 1 for all event firms and 0 for 
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matched firms. All explanatory variables are estimated at one accounting year before 
the announcement date.  
 
Table 2.2 shows the results of logistic regressions to test the first hypothesis. Model 1 
in Panel A includes EBIT over total assets and shows that event firms have smaller 
EBIT. This finding suggests that firms tend to change their strategies or make a new 
strategy when they have lower operating performance in the past. At the same time, 
Panel A reports a significant positive sales growth. Even though event firms have 
worse performance before their strategy change announcements, they might still have 
potential growing prospects. To further check firms’ performance, earnings per share 
and price to book are included in Panel B. Coefficients of earnings per share and price 
to book are significantly negative. This further indicates that firms tend to change their 
current strategies when they suffer negative operating performance and when their 
market value of equity is lower than their book value of equity. Smaller market value 
of equity suggests that the market has lower expectations for these event firms. These 
findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggest that event firms have worse 
performance but have higher growth prospects relative to their matched firms.  
 
- Insert Table 2.2 about here - 
 
Table 2.3 reports results of logistic regressions that demonstrate financial 
characteristics of event firms. Panel A shows that coefficients of both current and cash 
ratios are significantly negative. Firms with less cash holdings and less current assets 
are more likely to change their current strategies. This suggests that event firms have 
higher risks of experiencing liquidity problems relative to matched firms. Panel B 
shows that event firms have a higher debt ratio, indicating high leverage before the 
strategy change announcement date. To test firms’ financial risk, Z-score (Altman, 
1968) is included in Panel B and is significantly negative. Therefore, event firms have 
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higher leverage and larger financial distress risk. Findings in Table 2.3 also support 
Hypothesis 1 that event firms face financial weakness before their strategy change 
announcement dates. 
 
- Insert Table 2.3 about here - 
 
Table 2.4 reports results of logistic regressions to test the second hypothesis. Change 
in R&D and change in capital expenditure are used as proxies to measure firms’ 
expansion or innovation. In Model 1, change in R&D is significantly positive and 
indicates that event firms spend higher expenditures to develop their innovation. 
Model 2 also reports positive and significant change in capital expenditure, indicating 
that event firms have increased their costs on physical assets. Model 3 includes two 
variables and show consistent results. Therefore, the findings are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 and suggest that event firms have expanded and created product or 
service innovations before the strategy change announcement date. 
 
- Insert Table 2.4 about here - 
 
Models 1 to 3 in Table 2.5 combines all variables in Tables 2.2 to 2.4 to examine the 
combining effect and show consistent findings in terms of EBIT to total assets, 
earnings per share, debt ratio, Altman’s Z-score and change in capital expenditure. 
Coefficient of change in R&D is marginally significant in Model 3. Coefficients are 
not statistically significant for price to book and cash ratio due to the high correlation 
with the Altman’s Z-score. They become significant if excluding the Z-score in models 
4 and 5. This indicates that the coefficients on price to book and cash ratio in Model 2 
and 3 of Table 2.5 are weaker due to multicollinearity issues. Therefore, my findings 
provide evidence to support Hypotheses 1 and 2, except for the growth potential. 
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- Insert Table 2.5 about here - 
 
Overall, my findings show that firms tend to have worse operating performance before 
the strategy change announcement date relative to their compared matched firms. They 
have less competitive operating performance, lower market expectations, face higher 
risk of financial distress but exhibit higher growth prospects.  
 
2.5.3. Market Reaction to Strategy Change Events 
 
To analyse the market reaction around the strategy change announcement date, Table 
2.6 reports the market adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of the 
event firms during the two trading weeks before and after the event date. Panel A 
shows that all CAARs within three days around the event date are significantly 
positive. The market expects that the changed/new strategies are beneficial for event 
firms and thus reacts positively. Panel B shows that most of the CAARs are 
significantly positive, except for the window (-10, 0). It suggests positive market 
reaction from one week before to two weeks after the announcement date. In line with 
Bagnoli et al. (2005a; 2005b), these findings indicate that the market takes longer time 
(i.e., ten trading days) to evaluate the qualitative information compared to the 
quantitative information. Panel C reports CAARs that excludes one day around the 
announcement date and shows that the CAARs are positive but less significant relative 
to Panels A and B. Majority of the abnormal returns come from the window (-1, +1). 
In summary, my findings in Table 2.6 are consistent with Hypothesis 3 that firms with 
changed/new strategies are associated with positive market reaction around the 
announcement date. 
 
- Insert Table 2.6 about here - 
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Table 2.7 reports the market adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns of the 
matched firms. In line with Table 2.6, most of abnormal returns are insignificantly 
different from zero. Without any strategy change announcements, matched firms do 
not experience a positive market reaction.  
 
- Insert Table 2.7 about here - 
 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show strong difference in stock performance around the strategy 
change announcement date between event versus matched firms. Table 2.8 further 
examines the significance of difference and reports the matched firms adjusted 
cumulative average abnormal returns, that is, the average difference in the stock 
returns across event versus matched firms. Consistent with Table 2.6, Panel A shows 
that all CAARs within three days around the event date are positive and significant, 
indicating higher returns compared with matched firms. The market perceives the new 
strategies as a more efficient approach and thus can increase firm value. Panel B 
extends the event windows to ten days around the announcement date and shows 
similar results. Panel C shows that CAARs are positive and significant until ten days 
after the event date, regardless of excluding the window (0,1). CAARs are not 
significant from ten/five to two trading days before the announcement date. Results in 
Table 2.8 are also consistent with Bagnoli et al. (2005a; 2005b) and further support 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
- Insert Table 2.8 about here - 
 
In summary, this section shows that firms are associated with significantly positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement date. This indicates the market’s good 
expectation of these changed/new strategies. 
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2.5.4 Post Event Performance 
 
To study the long-term operating performance of event firms after the strategy change 
announcement date, Table 2.9 reports the results of difference in differences (DinD), 
the difference in performance of event firms from one accounting year before (t-1) to 
one accounting year after (t+1) the event date minus the difference in performance of 
matched firms over the same period. Table 2.9 shows that DinDs of annual sales 
growth and price to book are positive and significant and indicates that event firms 
have better future growth prospects and higher market expectations. DinDs of current 
ratio, cash ratio and Altman’s Z-Score are also significantly positive and DinD of debt 
ratio is significantly negative, suggesting that event firms have better operating 
performance, are more liquid and have less financial distress risk. In addition, event 
firms tend to carry on expanding their products or services since one year after the 
announcement date: DinDs of capital expenditure over total assets and change in 
capital expenditure are positive and significant. Overall, Table 2.9 confirms 
Hypothesis 4 that event firms are likely to improve their performance after the 
announcement date.    
        
- Insert Table 2.9 about here - 
 
To summarize, these findings show that after implementing the changed/new 
strategies, firms tend to have better operating performance, higher market expectation 
and higher long-term growth options. They are also more liquid, less financially 
distressed and exhibit high expansion of products and services.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyses the firm characteristics of event firms that announce 
changed/new strategies and the followed stock market reaction and long-term firm 
performance. U.S. headquartered firms with strategy change announcements over the 
period 2010-2012 are manually collected. The final sample contains 124 event firms 
and 124 published listed firms matched by total assets and industry.  
 
I find that event firms have worse performance than matched firms at one accounting 
year before the announcement date. They have less competitive operating activities, 
higher financial distress risk, lower market expectations but higher growth prospects. 
Therefore, event firms decide to change or renew their current strategies. The chapter 
then shows that event firms have significantly positive stock performance around the 
strategy change announcement date. It suggests that the market have good 
expectations of implementing these strategy changes. Furthermore, event firms exhibit 
better operating performance and market expectation and have high long-term growth 
potential at one accounting year after the announcement date. Event firms also have 
improved liquidity and smaller financial distress risk. At the same time, they keep 
expanding their products and services from before to after the announcement date. 
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2.7 Appendix 
Variable Definition   
 
Variable Definition Source 
AAR 
The average daily abnormal returns across 
different firms. 
CRSP; 
DataStream 
AR 
The daily difference between the raw return 
and the expected return (i.e., S&P500).  
CRSP; 
DataStream 
CAAR 
Average abnormal returns across different 
firms over a period of time. 
CRSP; 
DataStream 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns for a firm over 
a period of time. 
CRSP; 
DataStream 
Cash Ratio 
Cash and short-term investments over current 
liabilities at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
Capital 
Expenditure to 
Total Assets 
Capital expenditure divided by total assets at 
one accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date.  
 
COMPUSTAT 
Change in 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Annual change in capital expenditure over 
the last accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date in percentage. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
Change in R&D 
Annual change in R&D expenditure over the 
last accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date in percentage.  
 
COMPUSTAT 
Current Ratio 
Current assets over current liabilities at one 
accounting year before the strategy change 
announcement date. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
Debt Ratio 
Total liabilities over total assets at one 
accounting year before the announcement.  
COMPUSTAT 
Earnings per 
Share 
Net income over total number of shares 
outstanding at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date. 
 
COMPUSTAT 
EBIT over Total 
Assets 
Earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date.  
 
COMPUSTAT 
Price to Book 
The closing stock price divided by book value 
per share at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date. 
CRSP; 
COMPUSTAT 
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Variable Definition Source 
R&D to Total 
Assets 
R&D expenditure divided by total assets at 
one accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date.   
 
COMPUSTAT 
Sales Growth 
One-year annual growth in total sales over 
the last accounting year in percentage.  
COMPUSTAT 
Size 
Natural logarithm of total assets at one 
accounting year before the strategy change 
announcement date. 
 
COMPUSTAT  
 
Z-Score 
1.2*(Working Capital over Total Assets) + 
1.4*(Retained Earnings over Total Assets) + 
3.3*(EBIT over Total Assets) + 0.6*(Market 
Value over Book Value of Debt) + 
0.999*(Total Sales over Total Assets). Based 
on Altman (1968). 
 
CRSP; 
COMPUSTAT 
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Table 2.1 – Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of 124 event firms and 124 matched 
publicly listed firms over the period 2010-2012. Event firms are companies that 
announce changed/new strategies. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) show the mean and 
standard deviation of event (matched) firms. Column 5 shows the difference in 
means for event versus matched firms and its significance. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize 
potential detrimental effect of outliers. All variables are estimated at one 
accounting year before the announcement date. The diﬀerences in means are 
tested using the t-test allowing for unequal variances. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) 
  Event Firms   Matched Firms   Mean 
Differences   Mean St.Dev.   Mean St.Dev.   
Total Assets 
(million USD) 
5366.9 10761.9   4320.3 9601.9   1046.6 
EBIT/Total Assets 0.008 0.187   0.036 0.155   -0.028 
Sales Growth 0.122 0.375   0.115 0.311   0.007 
Earnings per Share 0.699 2.301   1.117 1.803   -0.417 
Price to Book 2.93 3.036   2.564 2.413   0.366 
Current Ratio 2.176 1.452   2.865 1.956   -0.690*** 
Cash Ratio 1.054 1.226   1.454 1.652   -0.400** 
Debt Ratio 0.588 0.269   0.446 0.223   0.141*** 
Z-Score 1.863 3.232   3.460 3.066   -1.596*** 
R&D/Total Assets 0.063 0.101   0.054 0.093   0.009 
Change in R&D 0.115 0.365   0.077 0.298   0.038 
Cap. Exp./Total 
Assets 
0.607 0.217   0.701 0.163   -0.094*** 
Change in Cap. 
Exp. 
0.162 0.741   0.151 0.501   0.012 
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Table 2.2 – Logit Analysis for Characteristics of Event Firms: Performance 
This table reports the logistic results for performance of firms with strategy change 
announcements over the period 2010-2012. The dependent variable equals to 1 for 
event firms and 0 for matched firms. The dataset covers 124 event and 124 
matched firms. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold. T-statistics are displayed 
in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of outliers. All 
variables are estimated at one accounting year before the announcement date. Year 
fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient 
estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.842 0.080 -0.852 
  (-0.535) (0.055) (-0.529) 
EBIT to Total Assets -2.245***   -2.335*** 
  (-3.335)   (-3.127) 
Sales Growth   0.675** 0.106** 
    (2.307) (2.110) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2  0.049 0.026 0.060 
Chi-Square 27.29 26.09 27.96 
Panel B Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -1.032 -0.185 -1.034 
  (-0.747) (-0.126) (-0.748) 
Earnings per Share -0.152**   -0.161** 
  (-2.451)   (-2.428) 
Price to Book   -0.034* -0.015 
    (-1.808) (-1.400) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2  0.051 0.034 0.062 
Chi-Square 22.97 23.57 24.65 
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Table 2.3 – Logit Analysis for Characteristics of Event Firms: Financials 
This table reports logistic results for financials of firms with strategy change 
announcements over the period 2010-2012. The dependent variable equals to 1 for 
event firms and 0 for matched firms. The dataset covers 124 event and 124 
matched firms. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold. T-statistics are displayed 
in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of outliers. All 
variables are estimated at one accounting year before the announcement date. Year 
fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient 
estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 12.925*** 12.979*** 13.645*** 
  (4.050) (3.658) (4.096) 
Current Ratio -0.206**   -0.470** 
  (-2.155)   (-2.155) 
Cash Ratio   -0.137* -0.319 
    (-1.818) (-1.345) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
#Observations 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2  0.046 0.032 0.054 
Chi-Square 24.37 24.81 26.03 
Panel B Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -1.205 -0.367 -1.228 
  (-0.671) (-0.245) (-0.696) 
Debt Ratio 2.234***   1.796** 
  (4.054)   (2.528) 
Z-Score   -0.129*** -0.131** 
    (-3.331) (-2.268) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2  0.071 0.072 0.090 
Chi-Square 25.28 26.57 28.03 
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Table 2.4 – Logit Analysis for Characteristics of Event Firms: Innovation 
This table reports the logistic results for innovation of firms with strategy change 
announcements over the period 2010-2012. The dependent variable equals to 1 
for event firms and 0 for matched firms. The dataset covers 124 event and 124 
matched firms. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold. T-statistics are displayed 
in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of outliers. All 
variables are estimated at one accounting year before the announcement date. 
Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.465 -0.064 -0.721 
  (-0.314) (-0.044) (-0.471) 
Change in R&D 3.333**   3.876*** 
  (2.558)   (2.834) 
Change in Capital Expenditure 0.053*** 0.063*** 
    (3.331) (3.703) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2  0.039 0.033 0.061 
Chi-Square 23.28 22.77 23.76 
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Table 2.5 – Logit Analysis for Event Firms Characteristics:     
Combining Effect 
This table reports the logistic results for firms with strategy change 
announcements over the period 2010-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 
2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental 
effect of outliers. They are estimated at one accounting year before the 
announcement date. All variables in Tables 2.2 to 2.4 are included in this table. 
Coefficient estimates are shown in bold. T-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. 
Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 11.343*** 13.876*** 10.695*** 15.281*** 13.054*** 
 (4.095) (3.602) (3.713) (4.640) (3.568) 
EBIT to Total 
Assets 
-1.797* 
 
-1.376  -1.520* 
 (-1.897)  (-1.049) 
 (-1.793) 
Sales Growth 0.011 0.111 0.041 0.053 
  (0.170) (1.103) (0.399) (0.351) 
Earnings per Share -0.141**  -0.153**  -0.168** 
 (-2.359)  (-2.304)  (-1.973) 
Price to Book 0.013 0.035 -0.052* -0.049* 
  (0.481) (1.122) (-1.809) (-1.733) 
Current Ratio -0.081  -0.089  -0.258 
 (-0.795)  (-0.403)  (-0.836) 
Cash Ratio -0.088 -0.265 -0.312* -0.284* 
  (-0.811) (-1.034) (-1.892) (-1.756) 
Debt Ratio 2.159***  2.031**  2.254*** 
 (2.770)  (2.498)  (3.241) 
Z-Score  -0.117*** -0.016   
  (-2.830) (-0.450)   
Change in R&D 2.347  4.200  2.922 
 (1.254)  (1.623)  (1.591) 
Change in Cap. Exp. 0.046*** 0.078** 0.859*** 0.713** 
  (2.774) (2.253) (2.764) (2.147) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES 
# Observations 248 248 248 248 248 
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.094 0.169 0.083 0.164 
Chi-Square 30.59 31.78 33.40 29.53 32.26 
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Table 2.6 – Short Term Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of Event Firms 
This table shows the results for cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the event firms around the strategy change announcement 
date. Event firms are companies that have strategy change announcements over the period 2010-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 
2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of outliers. Panel A shows the results for event firms 
within 3 days around the announcement date. Panel B shows the results for 5 and 10 trading days, which is equivalent to 1 and 2 trading 
weeks. Panel C shows the CAARs from 5 or 10 trading days to 2 trading days before the announcement date. ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A (-1,0) (0,1) (-1,1) (-3,0) (0,3) (-3,3) 
CAAR 1.38%*** 0.97%** 1.59%*** 1.37%** 2.08%*** 2.69%*** 
Std. Dev. 0.053 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.070 0.085 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics 2.819 2.131 2.908 2.136 3.236 3.472 
P-value 0.006 0.035 0.004 0.035 0.002 0.001 
              
Panel B (-5,0) (0,5) (-5,5) (-10,0) (0,10) (-10,10) 
CAAR 1.61%** 2.55%*** 3.40%*** 1.48% 2.71%*** 3.43%** 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.087 0.104 0.118 0.104 0.157 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics 2.214 3.194 3.561 1.367 2.851 2.382 
P-value 0.029 0.002 0.001 0.174 0.005 0.019 
              
Panel C (-5,-2) (2,5) (-10,-2) (2,10)     
CAAR 0.24% 1.58%** 0.10% 1.74%*     
Std. Dev. 0.069 0.081 0.105 0.101     
# Observations 124 124 124 124     
T-statistics 0.377 2.139 0.105 1.917     
P-value 0.707 0.034 0.916 0.058     
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Table 2.7 – Short Term Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of Matched Firms  
This table shows the results for cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the matched firms. Matched firms are firms that have 
similar size and are in the same industry with event firms while do not have strategy change announcements during the sample period 2010-
2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of 
outliers. Panel A shows the results for event firms within 3 days around the announcement date. Panel B shows the results for 5 and 10 
trading days, which is equivalent to 1 and 2 trading weeks. Panel C shows the CAAR from 5 or 10 trading days to 2 trading days before 
the announcement date. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A (-1,0) (0,1) (-1,1) (-3,0) (0,3) (-3,3) 
CAAR 0.01% -0.05% 0.13% -0.19% -0.07% -0.09% 
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.035 0.045 0.057 0.06 0.069 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics 0.028 -0.159 0.317 -0.360 -0.136 -0.144 
P-value 0.978 0.874 0.752 0.719 0.892 0.886 
                          
Panel B (-5,0) (0,5) (-5,5) (-10,0) (0,10) (-10,10) 
CAAR -0.09% -0.90% -0.83% -0.41% -1.49% -1.72% 
Standard Deviation 0.064 0.09 0.103 0.116 0.112 0.126 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics -0.162 -1.100 -0.879 -0.385 -1.442 -1.498 
P-value 0.872 0.274 0.381 0.701 0.152 0.137 
                          
Panel C (-5,-2) (2,5) (-10,-2) (2,10)         
CAAR -0.11% -0.85% -0.42% -1.43%         
Standard Deviation 0.039 0.061 0.081 0.088         
# Observations 124 124 124 124         
T-statistics -0.298 -1.521 -0.569 -1.781         
P-value 0.767 0.131 0.571 0.077         
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Table 2.8 – Short Term CAARs: Event versus Matched Firms 
This table shows the difference between the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of event and matched firms. Event firms 
are companies that that have strategy change announcements during the sample period 2010-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 
2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect of outliers. Panel A shows the results for event 
firms within 3 days around the announcement date. Panel B shows the results for 5 and 10 trading days, which are equivalent to 1 and 
2 trading weeks. Panel C shows the CAARs from 5 or 10 trading days to 2 trading days before the announcement date.  ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A (-1,0) (0,1) (-1,1) (-3,0) (0,3) (-3,3) 
CAAR 1.37%*** 1.02%** 1.46%*** 1.55%** 2.16%** 2.78%*** 
Standard Deviation 0.055 0.048 0.054 0.070 0.097 0.104 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics 2.728 2.296 2.927 2.423 2.432 2.906 
P-value 0.007 0.023 0.004 0.017 0.017 0.004 
              
Panel B (-5,0) (0,5) (-5,5) (-10,0) (0,10) (-10,10) 
CAAR 1.71%** 3.45%*** 4.23%*** 1.89%** 4.19%*** 5.15%*** 
Standard Deviation 0.085 0.130 0.142 0.086 0.161 0.18 
# Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
T-statistics 2.183 2.893 3.243 2.407 2.841 3.119 
P-value 0.031 0.005 0.002 0.018 0.005 0.002 
              
Panel C (-5,-2) (2,5) (-10,-2) (2,10)     
CAAR 0.34% 2.43%** 0.52% 3.17%**     
Standard Deviation 0.075 0.118 0.069 0.153     
# Observations 124 124 124 124     
T-statistics 0.496 2.246 0.826 2.260     
P-value 0.621 0.027 0.410 0.026     
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Table 2.9 – Post-Event Analysis: Difference in Differences for Event and Matched Firms 
This table compares the summary statistics of event and matched firm between the pre- and the post-event period. The sample consists of 
124 event firms and 124 matched firms. Event firms are companies that have strategy change announcements during the sample period 
2010-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise potential detrimental effect 
of outliers. DinD denotes difference in differences, which is the difference in performance of event firms from one accounting year before 
(t-1) to one accounting year after (t+1) the announcement date minus the difference in performance of matched firms over the same periods. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Event Firms   Matched Firms   DinD 
  Post-Event (1)   Pre-Event (2)   Post-Event (3)   Pre-Event (4)   (1-2) - 
  Mean St. Dev.   Mean St. Dev.   Mean St. Dev.   Mean St. Dev.   (3-4) 
EBIT/Total Assets 0.025 0.237   0.008 0.187   0.016 0.212   0.036 0.155   0.037 
Sales Growth 0.174 0.21   0.122 0.375   0.06 0.19   0.115 0.311   0.107*** 
Earnings per Share 0.707 1.827   0.699 2.301   1.063 1.781   1.117 1.803   0.061 
Price to Book 3.365 2.411   2.93 3.036   2.488 2.279   2.564 2.413   0.511* 
Current Ratio 2.257 1.128   2.176 1.452   2.544 1.665   2.865 1.956   0.403** 
Cash Ratio 1.129 0.839   1.054 1.226   1.062 1.152   1.454 1.652   0.466*** 
Debt Ratio 0.566 0.261   0.588 0.269   0.478 0.215   0.446 0.223   -0.053** 
Z-Score 2.129 4.392   1.863 3.232   2.611 3.535   3.460 3.066   1.115*** 
R&D/Total Assets 0.075 0.106   0.063 0.101   0.051 0.094   0.054 0.093   0.014 
Change in R&D 0.059 0.277   0.115 0.365   0.076 0.24   0.077 0.298   -0.055** 
Cap. Exp./Total Assets 0.633 0.177   0.607 0.217   0.666 0.167   0.701 0.163   0.06** 
Change in Cap. Exp. 0.163 0.301   0.162 0.741   0.010 0.275   0.151 0.501   0.142*** 
Total Assets (million USD) 6355 16433   5367 10762   4708 12369   4320 9602   601 
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Chapter Three 
The Information Content of Strategy 
Change Announcements 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
It is easy for market participants to communicate by estimating quantitative 
information including accounting variables. Nevertheless, only incorporating 
quantitative information alone is not enough to explain stock price movement since 
firms also release qualitative information to the market. Market participants tend to 
analyse stock price reaction using both quantitative and qualitative information. In 
other words, qualitative information has its irreplaceable value for market participants. 
The literature so far has conducted content analysis on qualitative information 
obtained from annual reports (Feldman, Govindraj, Livnat and Segal, 2010), news 
(Dougal et al., 2012), earnings conference calls (Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012) 
and IPOs (Loughran and McDonald, 2013) but overlooked an important source of 
valuable qualitative information, strategy change announcements, which contain 
management’s belief about firms’ future and management’s intended actions to 
reallocate companies’ resources. More interestingly, the extent of information 
disclosure is under the discretion of the management. The quality of the information 
disclosure can influence firms’ return. Despite of its importance and relevance, there 
is very little empirical evidence concerning the content of strategy change 
announcements and its associated impact on stock returns.  
 
In this chapter, I study the impact of positive and negative words in FACTIVA news 
on stock price movement around the strategy change announcement date. Further, I 
compare tones in more informative strategy change announcements relative to less 
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informative ones and compare FACTIVA news versus annual reports to find out the 
source of announcements.  
 
First, this chapter investigates the effect of tones in FACTIVA news on stock 
performance after strategy change announcements. In addition to publicly disclosed 
accounting variables and analysts’ forecasts, qualitative information may also provide 
incremental power for explaining stock prices (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011; 
Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). One important type of qualitative information is FACTIVA 
news about the strategy change announcement which includes firms’ new direction in 
short-term and long-term investment (Middleton, 2003). The information about 
strategy change announcement is privately owned by the firms and the managers can 
optionally disclose it, as preparing the unique set of private information is time costing 
and requires lots of effort. Credible managers may option to voluntarily release the 
information and signal the market that this discretional disclosure is valuable for their 
firms’ long-term development in addition to the available quantitative information 
(Molly, 2004; Bens and Monahan, 2004). Therefore, I conjecture that tones in 
FACTIVA news about the strategy change announcement are very likely to exhibit 
incremental explanatory power for stock returns after the announcement date.  
 
This chapter includes 562 FACTIVA news of 133 strategy change announcements 
over the period from 2010 to 2015. Strategy change announcements mean that firms 
refine their current strategies to change their operating direction (i.e, major changes) 
or make different strategies that were not included in the current strategies (i.e., new 
strategies). The new strategies provide a new direction of firms’ long-term operations. 
I find that both positive and negative weight powers have incremental power for 
explaining the market stock reaction in addition to accounting variables. That is, 
higher occurrence of positive (negative) words are associated with more positive 
(negative) stock returns. I find consistent but a bit weaker results for both positive and 
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negative words when using the annual report dates rather than the FACTIVA news 
dates and using the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N rather than the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon word list. 
 
Further, I explore the informativeness of strategy change announcements and 
investigate its effect on the market reaction. More informative announcements include 
detailed strategic implementation processes which represent firms’ attempt to change 
into more competitive strategies and thus may enhance firm value. It can further 
mitigate the information asymmetry between managers and investors and figure out 
private signals included in the available quantitative accounting variables (Botosan, 
1997; Hirst et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and Monhan, 2004). In 
contrast, less informative strategy change announcements are oversimplified and list 
only a new set of goals, without much justifications. Therefore, I conjecture that more 
informative strategy change announcements have more predicting powers in 
explaining stock returns. My findings confirm the difference and further show that 
higher occurrence in positive (negative) words is associated with more positive 
(negative) stock returns when the announcement is more (less) informative. It suggests 
that market participants consider bad words as more credible while need verifiable 
forward-looking information to support good words (Hutton et al., 2003).  
 
Findings in terms of more versus less informative strategy change announcements are 
re-emanated after regressing change in CAR [0, 3] on change in positive or/and 
negative weight powers over different time periods. I find that changes in positive 
(negative) weight power is associated with increasing (decreasing) abnormal returns.  
 
Next, I compare the content of FACTIVA news versus annual reports. Annual reports 
are released later and may contain the words describing the changed/new strategies. I 
find that positive words in these two sources of information have similar positive 
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impact on stock prices. Nevertheless, higher weights of negative words in annual 
reports are associated with more negative abnormal returns. Market participants 
seriously consider the negative information as firms include negative words in their 
annual reports when it is inevitable.  
 
My main contribution to the literature is to show that contents of strategy change 
announcements are important in explaining the stock returns. Stock returns are more 
positive (negative) when weights of positive (negative) words are higher. Furthermore, 
the effects of positive (negative) words are stronger for more (less) informative 
strategy announcements. A vital general contribution to the wider strategy literature is 
to highlight that firms can enhance their firm value by changing the old uncompetitive 
strategies.  
 
My analysis also contributes to the recent empirical literature that explores the 
qualitative information and their impact on the stock prices (Antweiler and Frank 2004; 
Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). Antweiler and Frank (2004) show that message 
board positing exhibits positive stock returns. Tetlock (2007) finds that media 
pessimism has negative effect on market prices. Tetlock et al. (2008) focus on the 
words in financial news stories and show that negative words are associated with small 
one-day delayed negative returns. My analysis extends the importance of qualitative 
information by investigating the strategy change announcement.  
 
Furthermore, my findings confirm that the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word list 
is better for content analysis compared with the Harvard Psychosociological 
Dictionary since it excludes the non-positive and non-negative words (e.g., capital, 
board, cost, liability, tax, foreign). I find that positive (negative) words have more 
positive (negative) effects on stock returns. My analysis also extends the measurement 
approach in Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) and provides a further evidence to show that 
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assigning different term weights to different words is more crucial in checking the 
market effect of the qualitative information relative to a complete set of word list. 
Future research on qualitative information should consider firms’ strategic 
announcements and use more appropriate textual analysis. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the 
related literature. Section 3.3 explains the research questions and economic intuition 
for my two main hypotheses. Section 3.4 introduces the sample data, explains the 
coding process and the methodology. Section 3.5 provides basic summary statistics of 
control variables and shows the regression results and robustness check, Section 3.6 
concludes.  
 
 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, I summarise recent studies that investigate the effect of qualitative 
information on stock prices. I also show how to use a quantitative method to analyse 
qualitative information. 
 
Antweiler and Frank (2004) investigate the impact of the “soft talk” information that 
is obtained from internet message boards, including “Yahoo! Finance” and “Raging 
Bull”, on the market price reaction. They show that message board posting is 
associated with positive stock prices followed by a price reversal. They also find that 
a greater disagreement in terms of message board posting exhibits a smaller next day 
stock trading volume. These findings provide evidence to show that “soft talk” is not 
noisy information. Tetlock (2007) conducts a similar analysis on the content of media 
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reports, “Abreast of the Market” in the Wall Street Journal, over the period from 1984 
to 1999. He finds that high level of media pessimism is likely to have a downward 
pressure on the market prices, which is followed by a reversion to the prices’ 
fundamental value. It suggests that the content of media reports provide additional 
information rather than incorporating new information about the stocks’ fundamental 
value. He further shows that unusually low or high value of media pessimism is 
associated with a high market trading volume. In addition, he suggests using the 
measurement of media content as a proxy for non-informational trading or investor 
sentiment.  
 
Tetlock et al. (2008) extend the analysis of Tetlock (2007) and examine the effect of 
negative words in Dow Jones News Services and Wall Street Journal Stories (i.e., the 
language in financial news stories) on S&P500 firms from 1980-2004. They use 
standardized fraction of negative words and show that beyond historical accounting 
data and analysts’ forecasting, negative words in the financial news of earnings tend 
to have a small one-day delayed negative market reaction. It means that linguistic 
variables can incrementally explain the movement of stock prices and future earnings 
when the traditional accounting and analyst data might not. They further compare 
negative words included in different stories and find consistent results.  
 
Most content analyses require word classifications. Before Loughran and McDonald 
(2011), studies commonly use the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary (i.e., the 
Harvard-IV-4 TagNeg (H4N) ﬁle) as the source for word classifications. However, the 
content analysis using the Harvard list is biased since it contains words (e.g., capital, 
board, cost, liability, tax, foreign and etc.) which are normally neither positive nor 
negative in ﬁnancial contexts. Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop an alternative 
more accurate word list that excludes these non-positive and non-negative words. 
They show that the new world list can better explain the relationship between 
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contemporaneous 10-K filings (or unexpected earnings) and the subsequent stock 
returns (or the trading volume) relative to the old one. That is, positive words exhibit 
a stronger impact on stock returns or trading volume and the effect of negative words 
become significant.  
 
Building on Loughran and McDonald (2011) word list, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) 
propose a new method to assess the qualitative information by allowing different 
weightings to different words rather than assigning the same weighting for all words 
commonly used in previous studies. They find that both positive and negative words 
in 10-K filings have incremental explanatory powers in terms of market prices in 
addition to the general explanatory words (e.g., size, book to market and etc.). They 
further claim that a proper choice of term weighting is more important relative to an 
accurate and complete set of word list.  
 
 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
 
In this section I propose that contents of strategy change announcements affect stock 
returns. Therefore, I provide two different hypotheses.  
 
Investors rely on three main sources of information, including analysts’ forecasts, 
publicly disclosed accounting variables and linguistic descriptions of firms’ current 
performance and future predictions. Large amount of studies conducts analyses on the 
market reaction by testing the effect of accounting variables (e.g., Fama and French, 
1993) and analysts’ reports (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005). The literature on the effect of 
linguistic information is very limited and relatively new (e.g., Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). These studies provide evidence to show 
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that linguistic information has an additional impact on the stock price movement and 
suggest that only using the accounting and analyst variables might not be enough. 
FACTIVA news about the strategy change announcement is a type of linguistic 
description and provides information about the new direction of firms’ future 
investment (Middleton, 2003). At the same time, corporate managers spend lots of 
time and effort on preparing the valuable private information and voluntarily release 
the news to the public. This voluntary disclosure reflects the credibility of firms’ 
managers and thus can provide incremental information in addition to the available 
quantitative information (Molly, 2004; Bens and Monahan, 2004). Alternatively, if the 
quantitative information contains all information needed by the market, the qualitative 
information provided by the FACTIVA news is likely to be irrelevant for explaining 
the stock prices. Therefore, my first hypothesis is summarized as:   
Hypothesis 1: Tones of strategy change announcements are likely to have incremental 
explanatory power for firms’ stock returns. 
 
The FACTIVA news about the strategy change announcement can be more or less 
informative. The level of informativeness represents firms’ attempt to show investors 
their sufficient effort in delivering a credible change in their strategies. The more 
informative FACTIVA news is able to provide market participants with new 
information in terms of the detailed strategic implementation steps. It also can confirm 
their private signals contained in the available quantitative information and thus might 
mitigate the information asymmetry between firms’ management and investors 
(Botosan, 1997; Hirst et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and Monhan, 
2004). The less informative news may only list down a new set of goals but do not 
provide with the corresponding implementation processes. Therefore, the 
informativeness of strategy change announcements provides the market with insights 
regarding the firm value. I argue that more informative disclosure of strategy change 
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announcement is associated with more positive explanatory power in terms of stock 
returns. In short, the hypothesis is formatted as:  
Hypothesis 2: Tones of more informative strategy announcements are likely to be 
associated with more pronounced firm stock price movements. 
 
 
 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
 
This section describes the data and methodology for testing the effect of strategy 
change announcements on stock returns. First, I introduce the process of collecting 
firms that have strategy change announcements. Strategy change announcements 
mean that firms refine their current strategies to change their operational direction (i.e, 
major changes) or announce different strategies that were not part of their original 
strategies (i.e., new strategies). New strategies aim to provide a new direction for, and 
a repositioning of, firms’ long-term operations. More specifically, the content of 
strategy change announcements includes: new markets that event firms try to expand 
into; new approaches to compete or maintain leadership; new products or services that 
event firms plan to launch; reasons for collaborating with new strategic partners; new 
involvement with e-commerce and other firm specific strategies introduced by event 
firms. 
 
In this chapter, my sample only includes firms that made public announcement about 
a new strategy or major changes in their current strategies from 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2015. The event firms are headquartered in the U.S. and listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. The strategic information of firms is manually collected 
from FACTIVA and EDGAR by searching keywords such as “new* … strateg*”, 
“chang* … strateg*”, “modif* …strateg*”, “alter* …strateg*” and “amend* … 
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strateg*”. “new* … strateg*” indicate new strategies while “chang* … strateg*”, 
“modif* …strateg*”, “alter* …strateg*” or “amend* … strateg*” indicate updating 
firms’ current strategies. Also, the “*” in the keywords allows to search for the root of 
a word followed by one or more characters. Additionally, keywords are searched at a 
maximum of 5 words apart in FACTIVA.  
 
Some firms may have more than one FACTIVA news in terms of strategy change 
announcements. For each single announcement, this chapter only includes news in the 
earliest announcement date when the event firms announce their strategy change news 
at the first time and the remaining ones are removed. Using the initial public 
announcement date can mitigate the effects of other concurrent information and thus 
might obtain a “cleaner effect” of strategy change announcements on stock prices 
movement. At the same time, FACTIVA news at the initial strategy change 
announcement date delivers the most important message. In addition, to obtain rich 
details from the strategy change announcement, FACTIVA news that contains less 
than 100 words are excluded from my sample. 
 
Furthermore, I require each firm to have at least 2 strategy change announcements 
over different years. The latter announcement date of the 2 strategy strategic changes 
is defined as the event date and the former date is denoted as the estimation date. In 
line with the literature (e.g. Hoberg et al., 2014), I further exclude firms with SIC code 
in the range of 4900-4949 (utility firms) and 6000-6999 (financial institutions). Private 
firms are deleted due to the unavailable information of stock prices. Public firms that 
have missing data are also deleted. I also exclude firms that have mergers and 
acquisitions in their strategy events. The final sample size includes 562 FACTIVA 
reports of 133 event firms. 
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In addition, the methodology is introduced. This chapter aims to conduct a content 
analysis on the tones of strategy change announcements. Previous literature classifies 
a list of positive and negative words and shows that the market reaction is associated 
with the relative proportion of positive or negative words to total words in documents 
(Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011). Nevertheless, these papers assume that all words in the positive (negative) word 
list have an equal positive (negative) impact. This indicates that the word “good” has 
the same positive impact with the word “best”. Similarly, the word “bad” has the same 
negative impact with the word “worst”. The equal effect among words is not consistent 
with the reality. 
 
In order to avoid potential biases from assigning wrong weighting to the positive and 
negative words, this chapter takes the approach proposed by Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013). Specifically, for each document, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) define a score 
which is positively correlated with the occurrence of each positive or negative word. 
This score is also positively correlated with the strength of each positive or negative 
word and inversely related to the total words in the document. Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013) score for a document i is formally presented as: 
                                                     Score𝑖 = ∑(𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
                                                (3.1) 
Where wj denotes the weight for word j, Fi,j denotes the number of occurrences of 
word j in the document i. 1/ai captures the effect that the score has a negative 
relationship with the total words in the document.  
 
Following Jegadeesh and Wu’s (2013) approach, the document score is correlated with 
the stock returns of companies that publicly release their strategy change 
announcements. The purpose is to measure the extent of information that the tone of 
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the strategy change announcement can convey to the market. The relationship can be 
shown as: 
r𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 (∑(𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖    
                                                = 𝑎 + (∑(𝑏𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                          (3.2) 
Where ri denotes the abnormal return when the i
th strategy change announcement is 
released. In the equation, Fi,j and ai can be calculated directly. However, the weighting, 
bwi, associated with each word is estimated by using the following regression equation: 
                                                 r𝑖 = 𝑎 + (∑(𝐵𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                       (3.3) 
Where Bj denotes the regression coefficients and provides an estimate for bwj. At this 
stage, b and wj cannot be estimated separately because the weighting measures the 
strength of each word in the lexicon. Nevertheless, the weights can be scaled 
arbitrarily. Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) standardise the estimates of Bj’s to provide an 
estimate of the weight of each word in the lexicon: 
                                               ŵ𝑗  =
B̂𝑗 − ?̅?
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (B̂𝑗)
                                   (3.4) 
Where ŵj denotes the estimate for wj, B̂𝑗  denotes the slope coefficient estimated 
from the Regression (3.3), ?̅? denotes the mean of all B̂𝑗.  
 
Importantly, I first estimate the ŵ𝑗  by using words included in FACTIVA news and 
abnormal returns around the strategy change announcement date during the estimation 
window. Then ŵ𝑗  is applied to estimate the score of analyst reports during the event 
window by using the Equation (3.1). 
Next, this chapter examines the impact of the score on stock returns by using the 
following regression: 
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                                                r𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 (∑(?̂?𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                     (3.5) 
 
In the first stage regression using the Equation (3.2), stock returns are regressed on the 
occurrence of positive (negative) words in FACTIVA news during the estimation 
windows. If the occurrence of positive (negative) words is associated with positive 
(negative) stock returns, the positive (negative) weight power is very likely to have a 
positive (negative) coefficient and have positive (negative) standardized weight ŵj. 
In the second stage using the Equation (3.5), stock returns are regressed on the positive 
(negative) word weight power that is estimated by using Equations (3.4) and (3.1) 
during the event window. If the occurrence of positive (negative) words is associated 
with the stock returns, the positive (negative) weight power is more likely to have a 
positive coefficient. In other words, the occurrence of positive (negative) words in 
FACTIVA news has incremental predicting power on stock returns. 
 
Therefore, the null hypothesis in Equation (3.5) is that b is equal to zero and indicates 
that the tone measurement for the strategy change announcement does not convey any 
incremental information to the market. The alternative hypothesis is that b is 
statistically greater than zero, suggesting that the tone measurement provides 
incremental information to market participants. 
 
 
 
3.5. Summary Statistics and Findings 
 
This section reports summary statistics of 133 event firms’ main characteristics at one 
accounting year before their strategy change announcement dates and the regression 
results to test my main hypotheses in Section 3.3. In Tables 3.1 to 3.9, all variables are 
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winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize potential detrimental effect of 
outliers. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 3.7. Tables 3.2 to 3.9 also 
include size, book to market of equity, volatility, turnover, accruals and momentum 
factor, as control variables (Jegadeesh and Wu, 2003).  
 
According to Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), risky firms tend to state potential 
consequences for the risk that they take compared to safe firms. Likewise, firms with 
recent poor performance are very likely to explain the reasons for such performance. 
As a result, tones of news can be affected by different firm-specific factors. This 
chapter includes firm-specific factors such as size, book to market, volatility, turnover 
and accruals. Size and volatility measure the risk of firms. Riskier firms tend to have 
more negative tone. Book to market ratio indicates growth or value firms. Growth 
firms tend to be more cautious with the information they disclose to the public. 
Turnover measures whether a particular stock is attractive to investors. Accruals 
represent changes in working capital. This may be caused by bad business conditions 
or earning manipulation. Momentum is a proxy for recent industry stock performance 
and thus is also included. 
 
3.5.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3.1 reports the main characteristics for the 133 event firms prior to the strategy 
change announcement date. Mean and median of market value of equity are 4.31 
billion USD and 1.78 billion USD respectively. The standard deviation is 5.38 billion 
USD, indicating that some firms might have a big size. Mean (0.436) and median 
(0.343) of book to market ratio are smaller than 1, suggesting the potential growth 
prospects for strategy changing firms in my sample. Volatility shows that the average 
change of stock returns is 8.60% over the last 60 months before the announcement 
date. Mean and median are 0.653 and 0.934 for turnover and are 0.094 and 0.062 for 
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accruals, respectively. Table 3.1 also includes momentum since it is important for 
impacting stock returns. Momentum is a monthly data downloaded from Kenneth R. 
French Data Library and is matched with the event month. Mean and median of 
momentum are 0.002 and 0.001, respectively. It indicates that industry stock prices of 
event firms keep increasing before the announcement date. 
 
- Insert Table 3.1 about here - 
 
3.5.2. Tones in FACTIVA News 
 
Tables 3.2 to 3.6 show the regression results of positive and negative weight powers 
on stock prices. The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns over a 4-day period after the announcement date (i.e., CAR [0, 3]) (Loughran 
and McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). Year fixed effects and Fama-French 
12 industry effects are also included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported to 
preserve space.  
 
Table 3.2 reports that coefficients of positive and negative weight powers are positive 
and significant at the 5% level. It suggests that higher occurrence of positive (negative) 
words exhibit more positive (negative) stock returns. Higher book to market ratio and 
lower accruals are associated with higher stock returns. This finding confirms 
Hypothesis 1 that positive and negative words in the FACTIVA news have 
incremental explanatory power for stock returns around the strategy change 
announcement date. 
 
- Insert Table 3.2 about here - 
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Next, I include two examples to introduce the process of classifying the “more” and 
“less” informative strategy change announcements, explain the two corresponding 
sub-sample sizes and investigate different effects of positive and negative words in 
FACTIVA news. 
 
It is under managers’ discretion whether the disclosed strategy change announcements 
are more informative or less informative. The informative discretionary disclosure is 
found to be associated with lower cost of capital, better stock performance and smaller 
information asymmetry (Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and 
Monahan, 2004 and Ferreira and Rezende, 2007). As a result, when managers plan to 
encourage investments in a particular strategic direction, they are likely to reveal the 
private information on their corporate strategies. 
 
First, more informative announcements include detailed processes to implement 
changed/new strategies. For example, people separately used smartphones and laptops 
before 2010, thus Apple Inc. announced a new strategy about developing a new mobile 
device that sit between smartphone and laptop. People are able to use the new mobile 
device to browse websites, display electronic books and play games. In 2010, Apple 
Inc. introduced an electronic tablet called “IPad” and believes that it is more capable 
than a smart phone and at the same time more intimate than a laptop. Reuters News 
(2010) conducted an online poll to more than 1,000 respondents. Nearly 30% of 
respondents had no interest in IPad, 37% of respondents were willing to buy IPad for 
500 to 699 USD and 20% would pay 700 to 899 USD. On the releasing date, the sale 
price of IPAD was announced to be 499 USD. Apple Inc estimated to sell up to 4 
million IPads in the first year and expected to generate sales of more than 4 billion 
USD in 2011 (Dow Jones Institutional News, 2010). The news about Apple Inc’s new 
strategy includes a detailed description of the appearance and capacity of IPad and 
summarizes the market research of the price that consumers are willing to pay for 
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before releasing. It also includes an estimation of annual sales of IPad after announcing 
the price. It further provides information about the profitability of Apple iPad's 3G 
services cooperated with its partner AT&T Inc. Therefore, I rate the strategy change 
announcement of Apple Inc as 10/10 for the highest level of informative disclosures 
and classify Apple Inc. and other similar firms as event firms with “more informative” 
strategy change announcements. 
 
Less informative announcements may only state their strategies in terms of goals that 
they wish to achieve without a detailed description of the implementation steps. For 
example, Financial News (2012) shows that Tower Watson planned to adjust their 
strategies in an economy where the scarcity was an increasingly common 
phenomenon. Tower Watson also mentioned some targets including providing growth, 
introducing new technologies and hedging against future inflation. Nevertheless, the 
company did not include detailed implementation steps in the news. Therefore, I rate 
the strategy change announcement of Tower Watson as 3/10 for the low level of 
informative disclosures and classify this firm and other similar firms as event firms 
with “less informative” strategy change announcement. 
 
Second for the two sub-samples, each event may have more than one FACTIVA news 
report. To investigate the effect of informativeness on stock performance, I combine 
different reports of one announcement into one news item and then divide the 133 
news items into “more or less informative” strategy change announcements. The first 
method depends on the median grade of informativeness of the 133 news and thus I 
divide the full sample into two halves. News of 67 firms are classified as more 
informative strategy change announcements and the remaining 66 are classified as less 
informative announcements. The second method depends on the quality of the 
information. A strategy change announcement is considered as more (less) informative 
when the news is rated from 6 to 10 (1 to 5). 
63 
 
 
Table 3.3 reports the results after including the informative announcement dummy. In 
Column 2, the dummy is defined using the first classification method, which equals to 
one for more informative strategy change announcements and zero otherwise. Column 
2 shows that the coefficient of the informative announcement dummy is significantly 
positive. It suggests that more informative strategy change announcements are 
associated with better subsequent stock performance. In Column 3, the informative 
announcement dummy is classified depending on the quality of information. 
Consistently, coefficient of the informative announcement dummy is positive and 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
 
- Insert Table 3.3 about here - 
 
Table 3.3 above shows that more versus less informative strategy change 
announcements have different impacts on the stock prices. To improve objectivity, I 
use the first classification method (i.e., based on the median informativeness) to divide 
the 133 combined FACTIVA news. I then count the original number of FACTIVA 
news for the 67 more informative and the 66 less informative strategy change 
announcements. Finally, more (less) informative firms have 335 (277) original news 
that are analysed in Table 3.4 (Table 3.5).  
 
Model 1 in Table 3.4 shows that the coefficient of the positive weight power is positive 
and significant at the 5% level. In model 2, the coefficient of the negative weight 
power is also positive but only significant at the 10% level. These findings suggest 
that the predicating power of positive words tends to be stronger relative to negative 
words. More informative strategy change announcements are able to provide the 
market with additional information to make better evaluation and thus enhance the 
predicting power of positive words. They include detailed processes to implement 
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their strategies and specific steps to achieve their goals. Model 3 shows consistent 
results.  
 
- Insert Table 3.4 about here - 
 
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.5 report insignificant coefficients for the positive weight 
power. It suggests that the less informative strategy change announcements tend to 
provide with less verifiable forward-looking disclosures. Coefficients of the negative 
weight power in Columns 2 and 3, however, are positive and significant (at the 5-
percent level). This suggests that higher occurrence of negative words in less strategy 
change announcements are associated more negative stock returns. As firms merely 
list their goals without telling the market detailed implementation approaches, the 
market might be very reluctant to fully trust their promised positive things. In contrast, 
rational investors in the market are risk averse and thus tend to more thoroughly 
evaluate the potential risks for the firms when negative words are included in the news.  
 
- Insert Table 3.5 about here - 
 
In summary, in line with Hutton et al. (2003), Tables 3.2 to 3.5 suggest that bad news 
is more credible but good news have to be supplemented with verifiable forward-
looking disclosures. These findings also confirm my second hypothesis that more 
informative strategy change announcements are associated with more pronounced 
market movement. Further, the tones of positive words have more positive market 
reaction for firms with more informative strategy change announcements. The 
negative words in less informative strategy change announcements are associated with 
more negative market price movement. 
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Additionally, firms that have strategy change announcements at one year are more 
likely to have different news at last year (e.g., sales growth, charity, lawsuits and 
layoffs). To differentiate the effect of strategy change announcements versus other 
news, I examine the impact of change in tones of FACTIVA news over different years. 
 
Table 3.6 examines the change in tone of FACTIVA news between time t with strategy 
change announcements and time t-1 without strategy change announcements by using 
the following regression: 
∆r𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 × ∆𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐 × 𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝑑 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 
                                              +𝑓 × 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑔 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖                                      (3.6) 
Note that the score in the Equation (3.6) is estimated using the one-stage regression. 
That is, I estimate the weightings for scoret and scoret-1 by using the estimation steps 
from Equations (3.2) to (3.4) and then calculate the two scores by using the Equation 
(3.1).  
 
Table 3.6 reports results of regressing change in CAR [0, 3] on change in positive 
or/and negative weight powers. I use change in CAR [0, 3] rather than CAR [0, 3] as 
the dependant variable to eliminate the time effect of last FACTIVA news on stock 
prices. In other words, change in CAR [0, 3] captures the adjusted abnormal stock 
price movement over different time periods. Coefficients of change in positive weight 
power are positive and significant (at the 10-percent level) only in model 3, indicating 
that 1-unit increase in the positive score would generate 2.50 units higher abnormal 
returns, assuming all other factors remain constant (the positive score is small than 1 
and the unit of change in CAR [0, 3] is in percentage, therefore, it is reasonable and 
equivalent to show that 1% increase in the positive score is associated with 2.5% 
increase in stock returns). Coefficients of change in negative weight power are positive 
and significant (at the 10-percent level in model 2 and at the 5-percent level in model 
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3), indicating that 1% increase in the score (i.e., negative score is less negative) 
exhibits 2.65% higher abnormal returns, assuming all other factors remain constant. 
 
- Insert Table 3.6 about here - 
 
In summary, this section shows that higher occurrence of influential positive (negative) 
words lead to more positive (negative) abnormal returns. Furthermore, positive words 
are associated with more positive returns when strategy change announcements are 
more informative. In contrast, negative words tend to exhibit more negative returns 
for less informative announcements. In line with Hutton et al. (2003), these findings 
suggest that people may consider bad news as credible while require verifiable 
forward-looking information to support good news.  
 
3.5.3. Tones in FACTIVA News versus Annual Reports 
 
FACTIVA news discloses information about the strategy change announcement to the 
public for the first time. Annual reports come later but with more detailed information. 
To investigate whether market participants react more strongly to the initial 
announcement versus more detailed information, this section compares the effects of 
FACTIVA news against annual reports and figures out possible additional effects of 
more detailed annual reports afterwards. The event dates for the 562 FACTIVA news 
refer to the initial public announcement dates in FACTIVA. The event dates for the 
133 annual reports are the firms’ fiscal year ending dates which are exactly after the 
corresponding initial FACTIVA news dates. 
 
In line with results in Table 3.2, Model 1 in Table 3.7 shows that higher occurrence of 
positive words in FACTIVA news reports are associated with more positive stock 
returns. Relative to the news, positive words in annual reports have similar positive 
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effect on stock prices: coefficient of the interaction term ‘Positive Weight Power * 
Annual Report Dummy’ is positive but not significant. The total effect (‘Positive 
Weight Power’ + ‘Positive Weight Power * Annual Report Dummy’) is positive and 
significant. This suggests that market participants have similar reaction to positive 
words in news and annual reports which are released later. The market considers that 
annual reports can provide some additional information about the changed/new 
strategies.  
 
- Insert Table 3.7 about here - 
 
Model 2 reports the effects of negative words and shows that coefficients of the 
negative score and interaction term (‘Negative Weight Power * Annual Report 
Dummy’) are positive and significant. In line with Table 3.2, higher occurrence of 
negative words in the news exhibits more negative stock returns. Further, negative 
words in the annual reports have stronger effect relative to the news. This suggests 
that market participants extra seriously consider the bad information in annual reports 
and have larger reaction to negative words. Model 3 combines both positive and 
negative weight powers and shows consistent findings.  
 
Overall, I find that positive words in FACTIVA news and annual reports are associated 
with similar positive stock reactions while higher occurrence of negative words in 
annual reports tend to have more negative returns relative to FACTIVA news. It might 
be because that managers are less incentivised to include negative information in 
annual reports and they include these negative words when it is inevitable, which are 
considered by the market as extra seriously. These findings further confirm Hypothesis 
1 that positive and negative tones in FACTIVA news have incremental power for 
explaining the stock performance. 
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3.5.4. Robustness Check 
 
Tables 3.2 to 3.6 use the dates of strategy change announcements firstly reported by 
FACTIVA news as the event dates. In order to investigate whether positive and 
negative weight powers still have predicting power after using different event dates, 
this section conducts a robust check by changing the FACTIVA initial announcement 
dates to annual report dates. Then I use the annual reports to get positive and negative 
weight powers. Table 3.8 shows that coefficients of both positive and negative weight 
powers are positive and significant, indicating incremental explanatory powers. 
Therefore, my findings in Table 3.2 are robust to different event dates.  
 
- Insert Table 3.8 about here - 
 
Tables 3.2 to 3.8 report regression results when using the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) lexicon to get the positive and negative weight powers. To have a robustness 
check, I use the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N world list rather than the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon to calculate positive and negative weight 
powers and report the results in Table 3.9. In line with findings in Table 3.2, 
coefficients of positive and negative weight powers are both positive and significant 
(at the 10-percent level). When comparing results using the Harvard-IV-4 TagNeg 
(H4N) versus the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word lists, I find that the latter 
provides stronger results. One reason is that the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word 
list contains more appropriate positive and negative words to measure the financial 
content relative to the Harvard-IV-4 TagNeg (H4N) world list. Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) develop the alternative word list and prove that they can better 
reflect the tone in financial contents. They remove words like capital, board, cost and 
liability from the Harvard word list, as these words are neither positive nor negative 
in terms of financial contents. 
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- Insert Table 3.9 about here - 
 
Overall, my findings in Table 3.2 are robust by changing initial releasing dates of 
FACTIVA news into annual report dates and by using the Harvard-IV-4 TagNeg word 
list to replace the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon.   
 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter uses the approach proposed by Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) to analyse the 
impact of positive and negative words in strategy change announcements on stock 
prices for 133 firms from 2010 to 2015. Overall, the findings show that both positive 
and negative words have incremental explanatory power on stock returns and higher 
occurrence of influential positive (negative) words tends to exhibit more positive 
(negative) stock reaction. The results are robust after changing the FACTIVA news 
dates to the annual report dates and changing the Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
lexicon to the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N word list.  
 
Further, the effects of positive and negative words are different depending on the 
informativeness (i.e., more versus less informative) of strategy change 
announcements. Higher occurrence of positive words is associated with more positive 
stock returns when strategy change announcements are more informative while higher 
weights of negative words tend to have more negative stock performance for less 
informative announcements. These findings are consistent with Hutton et al. (2003) 
and suggest that bad news is more likely to be credible while good news need to be 
supplemented with verifiable forward-looking disclosures. In addition, I find that 
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increasing occurrence of positive (negative) words are associated with rising 
(dropping) abnormal returns over different time periods.  
 
The chapter also investigates the different sources of strategy change announcements 
and shows that market participants have similar reaction to the positive tone of 
FACTIVA news relative to annual reports. Nevertheless, the negative tone of annual 
reports is associated with more incremental explanatory power (i.e., more negative 
stock returns) relative FACTIVA news. One possible explanation is that firms are 
more likely to report positive information in their annual reports. Firms may disclose 
negative information in the annual reports when it is inevitable and thus market 
participants consider this negative information as extra seriously. 
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3.7 Appendix 
Variable Definition 
Variable Definition Source 
Accruals 
One-year change in current assets excluding 
cash minus change in current liabilities 
excluding long-term debt in current 
liabilities and taxes payable minus 
depreciation divided by average total assets. 
Based on Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). 
COMPUSTAT;             
CRSP                 
Annual Report 
Dummy 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for annual 
reports and 0 for strategy change 
announcement news. 
Hand 
Collection 
AR 
The daily difference between the raw return 
and the expected return (i.e., S&P500).  
CRSP;                   
DataStream 
Book to Market 
Book value of equity over the market 
capitalization at one accounting year before 
the strategy change announcement date.     
COMPUSTAT;              
CRSP                 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns for a firm over 
a period of time. 
CRSP;                   
DataStream 
Change in 
Negative 
Weight Power 
The difference in negative weight power of 
FACIVA news for event firms with strategy 
change announcements versus without 
announcements at 1 year ago. 
CRSP;           
Hand 
Collection 
Change in 
Positive Weight 
Power 
The difference in positive weight power of 
FACIVA news for event firms with strategy 
change announcements versus without 
announcements at 1 year ago. 
CRSP;           
Hand 
Collection 
Informative 
Announcement 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if event firms 
provide detailed information about strategy 
change announcements and 0 otherwise. 
Hand 
Collection 
Momentum 
The difference between the monthly 
average return of the two high prior return 
portfolios and the monthly average return of 
the two low prior return portfolios. It is 
denoted as, Momentum = 1/2*(Small High 
+ Big High) – 1/2*(Small Low + Big Low). 
Based on Kenneth R. French - Data Library. 
Kenneth R. 
French - Data 
Library 
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Variable Definition Source 
Size 
Natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity (i.e., stock price times the total 
number of shares outstanding) at one 
accounting year before the strategy change 
announcement date. 
COMPUSTAT;              
CRSP                 
Turnover 
The natural logarithm of the number of 
shares trading during the period from 6 to 
252 trading days before the strategy change 
announcement date divided by the number 
of shares outstanding on the filing date. 
Based on Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). 
CRSP 
Volatility 
The standard deviation of the firm-specific 
component of returns that are estimated 
using up to 60 months of data. Based on 
Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). 
CRSP 
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Table 3.1 - Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of my sample over the period 2010-
2015. The sample consists of 562 FACTIVA news from 133 event firms. 
Event firms are companies that have strategy change announcements. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 show the mean, standard deviation and median of event 
firms, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimize potential detrimental effect of 
outliers. All variables are estimated at one accounting year before the 
announcement date.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Market Value (million USD) 4307.2 5382.6 1777.3 
Size 7.550 1.616 7.482 
Book to Market 0.436 0.381 0.343 
Momentum 0.002 0.024 0.001 
Volatility 0.086 0.089 0.071 
Turnover 0.653 0.934 0.592 
Accruals 0.094 0.171 0.062 
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Table 3.2 – Effect of Strategy Change Announcement on Stock Returns 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 562 FACTIVA news from 133 event firms. Event firms are companies 
that have strategy change announcements. The dependent variable is CAR 
[0, 3]. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed 
in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of 
outliers. All control variables are estimated at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and 
Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates 
are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.013 0.014 0.018 
 (1.046) (0.866) (1.388) 
Positive Weight Power 1.160**  1.783** 
 (2.210)  (2.460) 
Negative Weight Power  1.410** 3.978** 
  (2.061) (2.036) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0004 
 (-0.755) (-0.980) (-0.641) 
Book to Market 0.026** 0.032** 0.027** 
 (2.337) (2.457) (2.467) 
Momentum -0.023 -0.045 -0.082 
 (-0.205) (-0.346) (-0.746) 
Volatility -1.006 -0.862 -0.985 
 (-1.411) (-1.040) (-1.323) 
Turnover 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (1.584) (0.860) (1.324) 
Accruals -0.128* -0.141* -0.061 
 (-1.892) (-1.870) (-0.901) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations (News Articles) 562 562 562 
R2 0.093 0.117 0.146 
F 2.578 2.371 2.712 
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Table 3.3 – The Informativeness of Strategy Change Announcements 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 562 FACTIVA news from 133 event firms. Event firms are companies that 
have strategy change announcements. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. 
Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in 
parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised at the 
1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. 
All control variables are estimated at one accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 
12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. 
***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] 
Based on the 
Median 
Based on the Quality 
of Information 
Constant -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 (-5.804) (-6.687) 
Informative Announcement 0.031* 0.030** 
 (1.866) (2.271) 
Control Variables   
Size -0.0005 -0.0002 
 (-0.007) (-0.161) 
Book to Market 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (4.357) (4.778) 
Momentum -0.085 -0.075 
 (-1.548) (-1.561) 
Volatility 0.104 0.042 
 (0.519) (0.256) 
Turnover -0.001 -0.0001 
 (-0.643) (-0.094) 
Accruals -0.111*** -0.118*** 
 (-2.994) (-3.799) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
# Observations (News Articles) 562 562 
R2 0.145 0.150 
F 2.900 2.930 
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Table 3.4 – More Informative Strategy Change Announcements  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 335 FACTIVA news from 67 more informative event firms with strategy 
change announcements. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. Coefficient 
estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All control 
variables are estimated at one accounting year before the strategy change 
announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-
French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not 
reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.095) (-0.104) (-0.249) 
Positive Weight Power 0.829***  1.401*** 
 (2.687)  (3.759) 
Negative Weight Power  2.851* 4.955*** 
  (1.846) (3.885) 
Control Variables    
Size 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.958) (-0.266) (-0.007) 
Book to Market 0.022** 0.038*** 0.031*** 
 (1.983) (3.634) (4.173) 
Momentum -0.137 -0.386 -0.260 
 (-0.500) (-1.587) (-1.492) 
Volatility 0.697 1.507** 1.556** 
 (0.858) (1.964) (2.367) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.011** -0.009** 
 (-0.007) (-2.140) (-2.536) 
Accruals -0.045 -0.046 0.072 
 (-0.947) (-0.071) (1.392) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations (News Articles) 335 335 335 
R2 0.108 0.101 0.167 
F 2.850 2.560 2.960 
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Table 3.5 – Less Informative Strategy Change Announcements  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 227 FACTIVA news from 66 less informative event firms with strategy 
change announcements. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. Coefficient 
estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All control 
variables are estimated at one accounting year before the strategy change 
announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-
French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not 
reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.010* 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (1.900) (3.584) (4.030) 
Positive Weight Power 0.161  1.107 
 (0.081)  (0.586) 
Negative Weight Power  3.423** 3.616** 
  (2.444) (2.553) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.0008** -0.0007** 0.0006** 
 (-2.387) (-2.307) (-1.986) 
Book to Market -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.366) (-1.470) (-1.468) 
Momentum -0.231*** -0.355*** 0.372*** 
 (-4.523) (-5.374) (-5.327) 
Volatility -1.391*** -1.532*** 1.562*** 
 (-4.723) (-5.865) (-6.208) 
Turnover 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (2.655) (4.016) (4.082) 
Accruals -0.264*** -0.258*** 0.256*** 
 (-3.399) (-3.541) (-3.552) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations (News Articles) 227 227 227 
R2 0.112 0.120 0.120 
F 2.250 2.210 2.740 
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Table 3.6 – Change in Tones of FACTIVA Reports  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 133 event firms. Event firms are companies that have strategy change 
announcements. The dependent variable is the difference between CAR [0, 3] 
and the CAR over the same period but at one year ago. Coefficient estimates 
are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise 
the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All control variables are estimated at 
one accounting year before the strategy change announcement date. T-statistics 
are calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: Change in CAR 
[0, 3] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.008 0.004 0.019 
 (-0.566) (0.284) (1.133) 
Change in Positive Score 0.602  2.501* 
 (0.636)  (1.930) 
Change in Negative Score  2.429* 2.645** 
  (1.789) (2.515) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (-0.062) (-0.205) (-0.276) 
Book to Market -0.005 0.003 0.008 
 (-0.237) (0.133) (0.356) 
Momentum 0.174 -0.006 -0.042 
 (0.643) (-0.022) (-0.141) 
Volatility -0.405 -0.567 -0.884 
 (-0.435) (-0.609) (-0.931) 
Turnover -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.686) (-0.820) (-0.773) 
Accruals -0.192 -0.177 -0.093 
 (-1.144) (-1.077) (-0.579) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations (New Articles) 133 133 133 
R2 0.098 0.113 0.140 
F 2.170 2.430 2.870 
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Table 3.7 – Annual Reports versus FACTIVA News 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 
using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists of 562 
FACTIVA news and 133 annual reports. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. 
Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All control variables are 
estimated at one accounting year before the strategy change announcement date. T-
statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.007 0.002 0.001 
 (-1.586) (0.270) (0.245) 
Positive Weight Power 2.053***  2.295*** 
 (4.655)  (5.589) 
Negative Weight Power  3.524** 4.719*** 
 
 (2.451) (3.994) 
Annual Report Dummy 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 (0.762) (0.194) (0.754) 
Positive Weight Power* 0.598  -1.481 
Annual Report Dummy (0.484)  (-1.602) 
Negative Weight Power*  4.558*** 5.462*** 
Annual Report Dummy  (2.986) (4.228) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 
 (-0.269) (-0.892) (-0.657) 
Book to Market 0.004 0.010 0.006 
 (0.655) (1.647) (1.048) 
Momentum -0.237* -0.325*** -0.377*** 
 (-1.848) (-2.599) (-3.000) 
Volatility 0.414* 0.381* 0.334 
 (1.707) (1.675) (1.618) 
Turnover 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.602) (0.310) (0.456) 
Accruals 0.003 -0.031 -0.025 
 (0.047) (-0.537) (-0.466) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Total Observations  695 695 695 
R2 0.134 0.164 0.197 
F 3.146 3.241 4.984 
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Table 3.8 – Annual Report Filing Period Abnormal Returns  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The sample consists 
of 133 event firms. Event firms are companies that have strategy change 
announcements. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. Coefficient estimates 
are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 3.7 and winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All control variables are 
estimated at one accounting year before the strategy change announcement 
date. T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are 
included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 (4.291) (4.714) (5.070) 
Positive Weight Power 0.499***  0.814*** 
 (2.679)  (4.236) 
Negative Weight Power  1.581** 2.684*** 
  (1.985) (3.046) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.571) (-3.708) (-3.759) 
Book to Market -0.032*** -0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (-6.027) (-5.958) (-5.580) 
Momentum 0.097 0.046 0.065 
 (1.400) (0.675) (0.952) 
Volatility 0.099 0.066 -0.020 
 (0.494) (0.375) (-0.108) 
Turnover 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (-0.618) (-0.685) 
Accruals 0.179*** 0.183*** 0.212*** 
 (3.773) (4.012) (5.187) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
#Observations (Annual Reports) 133 133 133 
R2 0.129 0.119 0.152 
F 2.895 2.778 3.285 
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Table 3.9 – Effect of Strategy Change Announcements on Stock 
Returns: Different Word Lists  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-
2015 using the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N lexicon. The 
sample consists of 562 FACTIVA news from 133 event firms. Event firms 
are companies that have strategy change announcements. The dependent 
variable is CAR [0, 3]. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-
statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 
3.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential 
detrimental effect of outliers. All control variables are estimated at one 
accounting year before the strategy change announcement date. T-statistics 
are calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.009*** -0.005 0.001 
 (-2.994) (-1.235) (0.384) 
Positive Weight Power 1.503*  1.098* 
 (1.910)  (1.831) 
Negative Weight Power  1.616* 1.275* 
  (1.954) (1.794) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (-1.189) (-1.420) (-1.421) 
Book to Market 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 
 (5.496) (5.041) (5.800) 
Momentum 0.031 0.178 -0.005 
 (0.746) (0.835) (-0.023) 
Volatility 0.194 0.002 0.002 
 (0.978) (1.138) (1.170) 
Turnover 0.004* -0.160*** -0.085** 
 (1.816) (-4.093) (-2.354) 
Accruals -0.157*** -0.069 -0.065 
 (-3.732) (-1.170) (-1.394) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
# Observations (News Articles) 562 562 562 
R2 0.089 0.094 0.131 
F 2.784 3.430 3.982 
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Chapter Four  
Change in Firm Strategies, Analyst 
Response and Market Reactions 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Analyst reports are a useful source of information that contains quantitative summary 
measures, including earnings forecasts, stock recommendation and target prices. 
Analyst reports also contain useful soft and non-financial qualitative information 
about companies’ business strategies, effectiveness of their management, risk 
exposure and competitiveness against their peer firms (Breton and Taffler, 2001). 
Institutional and individual investors rely on both quantitative and qualitative 
information of analyst reports when making financial decisions. Tsao (2002) points 
out that target prices and stock ratings (i.e., quantitative information) are the skin and 
bones of analysts’ research, while details and tone (i.e., qualitative information) are 
the meat of such reports.  
 
In reality, despite the fact that analysts’ quantitative outputs are available on databases 
(e.g., I/B/E/S), market participants still expend vast amounts of their money in 
accessing the full content of analyst reports. Therefore, qualitative information is also 
very important to market participants. Nevertheless, the existing literature focuses 
almost exclusively on quantitative information and overlooks the qualitative 
information of the analysts’ reports. The disproportion between quantitative and 
qualitative information studies may prevent the literature from developing a more 
comprehensive understanding of analysts’ role (Bradshaw, 2011). The aim of the 
chapter is to analyse the impact of the content of analyst reports on stock price 
movement around the strategy change announcement date.  
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First, this chapter investigates the impact of tones in analyst reports on stock returns 
after the strategy change announcement date. It is triggered by different information 
in terms of strategy change announcement included in managers’ discretionary 
disclosures versus analyst reports. The former one is managers’ voluntary disclosure 
(Botosan, 1997; Hirst et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and Monahan, 
2004) and managers may be less incentivized to include all information when they do 
not have detailed plan to implement their strategies. In contrast, analysts are more 
knowledgeable the event firms and industry specific information to provide a valuable 
estimation of firms’ performance after the announcement date. Market participants 
thus consider information in analyst reports as supplementary, necessary and more 
credible. As a result, I conjecture that tones in analyst reports are associated with 
incremental power for explaining stock returns. 
 
This chapter includes 721 analyst reports of 133 strategy change announcements over 
the period from 2010 to 2015. Strategy change announcements mean that firms make 
major changes in their current strategies and direction or introduce different strategies 
that were not included in their current strategies (i.e., new strategies). The new 
strategies provide a new direction of firms’ long-term operations. I find that both 
positive and negative weight powers have incremental explanatory power for 
abnormal returns in addition to accounting variables. In other words, higher 
occurrence of influential positive (negative) words leads more positive (negative) 
stock returns. The results are consistent but weaker when changing the Harvard 
Psychosociological Dictionary H4N word list into the Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
lexicon. The former one includes words that are neither positive nor negative in 
financial contexts (e.g., capital, board, cost, liability, tax, foreign) and thus can weaken 
the impacts of positive and negative words.  
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Next, this chapter focuses on the effect of positive and negative words in analyst 
reports on stock performance. Managers prefer to including good words but avoid 
containing negative words in their announcements and thus analysts are important in 
telling the “bad truth” (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Miller, 2002; Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki, 2009). Therefore, market participants may consider negative words in 
analyst reports as more credible and have strong negative reactions. In contrast, they 
assume positive words as less reliable because they have already received positive 
information from the managers. My findings confirm that negative words in analyst 
reports tend to cause stronger negative effects on stock returns compared with positive 
impacts by positive words.  
 
Furthermore, I analyse whether tones in analyst reports of more informative strategy 
change announcements have similar effects relative to less informative ones. More 
informative announcements generally include detailed implementation process (e.g., 
anticipated prices, customers and sales) of the changed/new strategies. Therefore, 
analyst reports are able to provide credible positive estimation which is associated 
with stronger positive market reaction. Alternatively, announcements are less 
informative because managers may hide or delay some bad information (Kothari et 
al., 2009). I conjecture that if negative words are included in analyst reports, market 
participants consider them as more credible and are more likely to have stronger 
negative reactions. Our results show that higher occurrence of positive words in 
analyst reports exhibits more positive abnormal returns when strategy change 
announcements are more informative. In contrast, for less informative announcements, 
higher frequency of negative words is associated with more negative abnormal returns.  
 
Findings in terms of more versus less informative strategy change announcements are 
confirmed after regressing change in CAR [0, 3] on change in positive or/and negative 
weight powers over different time periods. I find that change in positive weight power 
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is not associated with change in abnormal returns. In contrast, higher presence of 
influential negative words leads to decreasing stock returns. This further suggests that 
market participants pay more attention to negative words included in analyst reports.  
 
The last question compares the tones in analyst reports relative to annual reports. 
Information in terms of strategy change announcements is voluntarily disclosed in 
annual reports and thus might be less informative. Differently, analysts are more 
skilful and may provide more information. Therefore, the market may consider analyst 
reports rather than annual reports as more credible and tend to have stronger reactions. 
My results confirm that higher occurrence of influential positive (negative) words in 
analyst reports exhibits more positive (negative) abnormal returns after the strategy 
change announcement date.  
 
My main contribution to the literature is to show that in addition to accounting 
variables and FACTIVA news, analyst reports are an important source of explaining 
the stock price movement. Frequency of positive (negative) words are associated with 
more positive (negative) stock performance. Furthermore, positive words in analyst 
reports exhibit stronger positive impacts when announcements are more informative 
and negative words have more negative impacts for less informative announcements. 
A vital general contribution to the wider strategy literature is to highlight that analyst 
reports are more credible relative to FACTIVA news and annual reports. 
 
My analysis also contributes to the recent empirical literature that explores the 
qualitative information and their impact on the stock reaction (Antweiler and Frank 
2004; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). Antweiler and Frank (2004) show that 
message board positing is likely to exhibit positive stock returns. Tetlock (2007) finds 
that media pessimism has negative effect on market prices. Tetlock et al. (2008) focus 
on the words in financial news stories and show that negative words are associated 
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with a small one-day delayed negative returns. My analysis extends the importance of 
qualitative information by investigating tones in analyst reports in terms of strategy 
change announcements.  
 
Furthermore, my findings confirm that the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word list 
is better for content analysis compared with the Harvard Psychosociological 
Dictionary since it excludes the non-positive and non-negative words (e.g., capital, 
board, cost, liability, tax, foreign). I find that higher presence of influential positive 
(negative) words leads to more positive (negative) effects on stock returns. My 
analysis also extends the measurement approach in Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) and 
provides further evidence to show that assigning different term weights to different 
words is more crucial in checking the market effect of qualitative information relative 
to a complete set of the word list.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 summarises the 
related literature. Section 4.3 explains the research questions and economic intuition 
for my four main hypotheses. Section 4.4 introduces the sample data, explains the data 
collection process and the methodology. Section 4.5 provides basic summary statistics 
of control variables and shows the regression results and robustness check, Section 4.6 
concludes.  
 
 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
This section summarizes recent studies that analyse the impact of qualitative 
information, including analyst reports, on the market price reaction.  
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The first group of studies investigate the outside qualitative information which 
excludes analyst reports. Antweiler and Frank (2004) find that internet message boards, 
which is a type of “soft talk” information and includes “Yahoo! Finance” and “Raging 
Bull”, exhibit positive stock returns followed by a price reversal. Further, a greater 
disagreement about message board posting is associated with smaller next day trading 
volume. Antweiler and Frank (2004) indicate that “soft talk” is valuable for market 
participants and thus not noisy information. Tetlock (2007) focuses on media reports 
in terms of “Abreast of the Market” in the Wall Street Journal from 1984 to 1999 and 
shows that high level of media pessimism tends to have decreasing stock prices. The 
price drop is reserved to the fundamental value subsequently. These findings prove 
that instead of incorporating new information, media reports can incremental explain 
firms’ fundamental value. He further finds that unusually low or high value of media 
pessimism is likely to have a high stock trading volume. Tetlock et al. (2008) extend 
the analysis of Tetlock (2007) and investigate the price movement of S&P500 firms 
from 1980 to 2004 depending on negative words in Dow Jones News Services and 
Wall Street Journal Stories (i.e., the language in financial news stories). They show 
that after excluding the effects of historical accounting information and analysts’ 
forecasts, standardized faction of negative words in earning news is associated with a 
small one-day delayed negative market reaction. Therefore, they prove that qualitative 
information may provide incremental information for stock price reaction in addition 
to traditional accounting variables and analyst information.    
 
Second, I summarize research on inside qualitative information. Feldman et al. (2010) 
show that management discussion and analysis in 10-K filings are significantly 
correlated with contemporaneous stock returns. Further, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) argue that the commonly used Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary (i.e., the 
Harvard-IV-4 TagNeg (H4N) ﬁle) is biased in content analysis as it includes words 
like capital, board, cost, liability, tax, foreign which are normally neither positive nor 
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negative in a ﬁnancial context. They develop an alternative more accurate word list 
that excludes these non-positive and non-negative words. Compared with the old word 
list, positive words in 10-K filings (or unexpected earnings) are associated with 
stronger positive stock returns or trading volume and negative words tend to have 
significant impact. Therefore, they provide evidence to show that the new word list 
can better explain the relationship between qualitative information and the subsequent 
stock performance. In addition, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) propose a new method to 
analyse the qualitative information. They assign different weights to different words 
rather than the same weight for all words. They show that after controlling the effect 
of general factors (e.g., size, book to market and etc.), both positive and negative 
words in 10-K filings tend to have incremental powers in explaining stock price 
reaction. They further claim that a proper choice of term weighting is more important 
relative to an accurate and complete set of word list.  
 
Third, I summarize findings of studies that conduct content analysis on analyst reports 
and test their effect on stock reaction. Asquith et al. (2005) find that changes in stock 
recommendations, summary of earnings forecasts, target prices and strength of 
arguments provide independent information to the market and are able to explain five-
day abnormal returns around the report date. Earnings forecasts have weaker effects 
on stock returns after including proxies for the strength of analysts’ arguments. They 
also show that content information of analyst reports is most important for 
downgrading firms and the only significant factors in terms of reiterations are target 
prices and analysts’ justifications. Twedt and Rees (2012) extend the research by 
Asquith et al. (2005) and claim that details are expected to reflect analysts’ level of 
knowledge when preparing the reports and tones are expected to reflect analysts’ 
underlying sentiments about firms. They find that details and tones of analyst reports 
can convey incremental information to market participants beyond the quantitative 
summary measures of reports. The details may explain cross-sectional variation in 
89 
 
stock prices after analysts’ recommendations. The tone provides incremental 
information to analysts’ recommendations and earnings forecasts.  
 
Huang et al. (2014) show that analyst reports are more important when analysts 
emphasize on nonfinancial topics (e.g., customer satisfaction, brand recognition and 
corporate social responsibility). They also find that words in analyst reports are likely 
to have more predicting power for the subsequent five years’ earning growth relative 
to quantitative summary measures. The rationale is that the content of analyst reports 
includes detailed fundamental analysis of management quality evaluation, strategic 
decisions and capital investments. Alternatively, Drake et al. (2011) suggest that 
analyst recommendation may obstruct the discovery process of market prices and thus 
can be associated with negative future stock performance. Conflict of interests is one 
rationale that adversely affect the quality of analyst recommendations. 
 
Different from investigating the effect of all words together, Kothari, Li and Short 
(2009) and Huang et al. (2014) further analyse the positive and negative words 
separately. Kothari, Li and Short (2009) show that more positive disclosures by news 
reporters, managers and analysts are associated with decreasing firm risks measured 
as cost of capital and return volatility and vice versa. Huang et al. (2014) find that 
negative words are very likely to have larger market reaction relative to positive words 
and are twice as informative as positive words in forecasting earnings growth. These 
findings suggest that analyst reports are important for propagating bad news.  
 
Fourth, I include studies that investigate the relationship between content of analyst 
reports and analysts’ compensation. Analyst reports that cover investment banking 
businesses are associated with larger effect on analysts’ compensation compared with 
the accuracy of earnings forecasts or the performance of their recommended stocks 
(Groysberg, Healy and Maber, 2011). As a result, analysts who wish to facilitate 
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potential underwriting relationships may provide favourable recommendations to 
influence their compensation structures, despite the recommendations are unable to 
justify firms’ fundamentals (Agrawal and Chen, 2008). 
 
 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
 
This section includes four different conjectures to conduct the content analysis of 
analyst reports on stock performance after the strategy change announcement date. In 
the first hypothesis, I focus on the effect of words in analyst reports as a whole. This 
analysis is motivated by Botosan (1997), Hirst et al. (1999), Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
and Bens and Monahan (2004), which consider the level of discretionary disclosure as 
a proxy of the management credibility. FACTIVA news of strategy change 
announcements are voluntary disclosures and managers may have less incentive to 
disclose all information needed by market participants, especially when they face 
challenges. In this case, analyst reports provide supplementary information and thus 
are more valuable relative to the simple FACTIVA news. Furthermore, analyst reports 
are more credible than voluntary disclosures as analysts are experts and can estimate 
their superior firm and industry information to provide a valuable estimation of firms’ 
performance after the announcement date. Therefore, my first hypothesis is 
summarized as: 
Hypothesis 1: The tone in analyst reports of the strategy change announcement is very 
likely to provide incremental explanatory power for stock returns. 
 
My second hypothesis focuses on the effect of positive versus negative words in 
analyst reports. Managers tend to quickly announce good news but are less likely to 
include bad information in the announcement; therefore, analyst reports are an 
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important source of bad news (Hong et al., 2000; Miller, 2002; Kothari, Shu, and 
Wysocki, 2009). Under the situation of already receiving good news from managers, 
the inclusion of bad words in analyst reports might strongly affect the stock 
performance since the market may consider these reports as more prudent. The market 
might thus assume positive words in analyst reports as less reliable while consider 
negative words as more credible. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The market tends to react more strongly to negative words in the analyst 
reports relative to positive words. 
 
My third hypothesis focuses on more versus less informative strategy change 
announcements. Managers are very likely to include more positive information in the 
announcement when they expect to encourage investments in a particular strategic 
direction. At the same time, more informative strategy change announcements have 
the benefits in terms of lower cost of capital, better stock performance and smaller 
information asymmetry (Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and 
Monahan, 2004; and Ferreira and Rezende, 2007). Therefore, analysts can analyse the 
detailed positive information to make better financial evaluations in their reports and 
enhance firm value.  
 
In contrast, bad news increases the chance of financial distress and more severely the 
probability of management turnover. Managers are thus strongly incentivized to hide 
or delay announcing this bad information (Kothari et al., 2009). At the same time, 
some analysts are optimistically biased because of their incentives to maintain access 
to information of existing firms and to develop their businesses with more firms. Since 
textual information is hard to assess, investors in the market might be risk-averse to 
over-optimistic analyst reports (Das et al. 1998, Epstein and Echneider, 2008). 
Investors are very likely to have strong negative reaction when negative words are 
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included in analyst reports and the strategy change announcement is less informative. 
Therefore, my third hypothesis is summarized as: 
Hypothesis 3a: Positive words in analyst reports are associated with more positive 
stock reactions when strategy change announcements are more informative. 
Hypothesis 3b: Negative words in analyst reports are associated with more negative 
stock reactions when strategy change announcements are less informative.  
 
My fourth hypothesis investigates the effect of analyst reports versus annual reports 
on the stock market movement. Despite firms are required to make annual reports, 
managers can voluntarily decide to include more or less information in terms of their 
changed/new strategies. This voluntary disclosure might not include sufficient 
information and thus is hard for investors to verify. Investors tend to reply more on 
analysts’ analytical skills and industrial knowledge. They are more likely to perceive 
analysts’ discussion of the strategy change announcements as more informative and 
more credible relative to managers’ disclosures. Therefore, my fourth hypothesis 
posits: 
Hypothesis 4: Analyst reports are very likely to have stronger market reactions after 
the strategy change announcement date relative to annual reports. 
 
 
 
4.4. Data and Methodology 
 
This section includes the data and methodology used to test my four proposed 
hypotheses. First, I introduce the process of collecting firms that have strategy change 
announcements (i.e., event firms). Strategy change announcements mean that firms 
refine their current strategies to change their operational direction (i.e, major changes) 
or announce different strategies that were not part of their original strategies (i.e., new 
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strategies). New strategies aim to provide a new direction for, and a repositioning of, 
firms’ long-term operations. More specifically, the content of strategy change 
announcements includes: new markets that event firms try to expand into; new 
approaches to compete or maintain leadership; new products or services that event 
firms plan to launch; reasons for collaborating with new strategic partners; new 
involvement with e-commerce and other firm specific strategies introduced by event 
firms. 
 
In the chapter, the sample only includes firms that made public announcements about 
a new strategy or major refinements in firms’ current strategies from 1 January 2010 
to 31 December 2015. The event firms are headquartered in the U.S. and are listed on 
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. The strategic information of firms is manually 
collected from FACTIVA and EDGAR by searching keywords such as “new* … 
strateg*”, “chang* … strateg*”, “modif* …strateg*”, “alter* …strateg*” and 
“amend* … strateg*”. The “*” in the keywords allows to search for the root of a word 
followed by one or more characters. At the same time, keywords are searched at a 
maximum of 5 words apart in FACTIVA. 
 
Some firms may have more than one FACTIVA news in terms of the strategy change 
announcements. For each single announcement, this chapter only uses the earliest 
announcement date when event firms announce their strategy change news at the first 
time and the remaining ones are removed. Using the initial public announcement date 
can mitigate the effects of other concurrent information and thus might obtain a 
“cleaner effect” of strategy change announcement on stock prices movement. 
Furthermore, firms with FACTIVA news that contains less than 100 words generally 
offer fewer details and thus are excluded. In addition, I require each firm to have at 
least 2 strategy change announcements over different years. The latter announcement 
date of the 2 strategy strategic changes is defined as the event date and the previous 
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date is denoted as the estimation date. In line with the literature (e.g. Hoberg et al., 
2014), I further exclude firms with SIC code in the range of 4900-4949 (utility firms) 
and 6000-6999 (financial institutions). Private firms are deleted due to the unavailable 
information of stock prices. Public firms that have missing data are also deleted. I also 
exclude firms that have mergers and acquisitions in their strategy events. Therefore, 
the final sample includes 133 event firms. 
 
Second, I collect analyst reports in terms of the 133 sample firms. Analyst reports are 
collected by using dates 0 to 3 when they reflect the strategy change announcements 
of event firms. The four days also allow analysts to spend sufficient time on 
investigating the value of the strategy change announcements. In total, 721 analyst 
reports are manually collected for the 133 event firms. 
 
Third, I introduce the methodology. This chapter aims to conduct a content analysis 
on the tones of strategy change announcements. Previous literature classifies a list of 
positive and negative words and shows that the market reaction is associated with the 
relative proportion of positive or negative words to the total words in the documents 
(Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011). Nevertheless, these papers assume that all words in the positive (negative) word 
list have an equal positive (negative) impact. This indicates that the word “good” has 
the same positive impact with the word “best”. Similarly, the word “bad” has the same 
negative impact with the word “worst”. The equal effect among words is not consistent 
with what we observe in reality. 
 
In order to avoid potential biases from assigning wrong weightings to the positive and 
negative words, this chapter takes the approach proposed by Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013).  Specifically, for each document, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) define a score 
which is positively correlated with the occurrence of each positive or negative word. 
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This score is also positively correlated with the strength of each positive or negative 
word and inversely related to the total words in the document. The score for a 
document i is formally presented as: 
                                                     Score𝑖 = ∑(𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
                                            (4.1) 
Where wj denotes the weight for word j, Fi,j denotes the number of occurrences of 
word j in the document i. 1/ai captures the effect that the score has a negative 
relationship with the total words in the document.  
 
Following Jegadeesh and Wu’s (2013) approach, the document score is correlated with 
the stock returns of companies that publicly release their strategy change 
announcement. The purpose is to measure the extent of information that the tone of 
the strategy change announcement can convey to the market. The relationship can be 
shown as: 
 r𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 (∑(𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖 
                                                      = 𝑎 + (∑(𝑏𝑤𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                    (4.2) 
Where ri denotes the abnormal return when the i
th strategy change announcement is 
released. In the equation, Fi,j and ai can be calculated directly. However, the weighting, 
bwi, associated with each word is estimated by using the following regression equation: 
                                                       r𝑖 = 𝑎 + (∑(𝐵𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                  (4.3) 
Where Bj denotes the regression coefficients and provides an estimate for bwj. At this 
stage, b and wj cannot be estimated separately because the weighting measures the 
strength of each word in the lexicon. Nevertheless, the weights can be scaled 
arbitrarily. Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) standardise the estimates of Bj’s to provide an 
estimate of the weight of each word in the lexicon: 
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                                             ŵ𝑗  =
B̂𝑗 − ?̅?
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (B̂𝑗)
                                   (4.4) 
Where ŵj denotes the estimate for wj, B̂𝑗  denotes the slope coefficient estimated 
from the Regression (4.3), ?̅? denotes the mean of all B̂𝑗.  
 
Importantly, I first estimate the ŵ𝑗  by using words included in analyst reports and 
abnormal returns around the strategy change announcement dates during the 
estimation window. Then ŵ𝑗 is applied to estimate the score of analyst reports during 
the event window by using the Equation (4.1).  
 
Next, I examine the impact of the score on the stock returns by using the following 
regression: 
                                           r𝑖  = 𝑎 + 𝑏 (∑(?̂?𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗)
1
𝑎𝑖
J
j=1
) + ε𝑖                                         (4.5) 
 
In the first stage regression using the Equation (4.2), stock returns are regressed on the 
occurrence of positive (negative) words in analyst reports during the estimation 
windows. If the occurrence of positive (negative) words is associated with positive 
(negative) stock returns, the positive (negative) weight power is very likely to have a 
positive (negative) coefficient and have positive (negative) standardized weights ŵj. 
In the second stage using the Equation (4.5), stock returns are regressed on the positive 
(negative) word weight power that is estimated by using Equations (4.4) and (4.1) 
during the event window. If the occurrence of positive (negative) words is associated 
with the stock returns, the positive (negative) weight power is more likely to have a 
positive coefficient. In other words, the occurrence of positive (negative) words in 
analyst reports have incremental predicting power on stock returns. 
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Therefore, the null hypothesis in Equation (4.5) is that b is equal to zero and indicates 
that the tone measurement for the annual reports does not convey any incremental 
information to the market. The alternative hypothesis is that b is statistically greater 
than zero and suggests that the tone measurement provides incremental information to 
market participants. 
 
 
 
4.5. Summary Statistics and Findings 
 
This section explains the summary statistics of firms’ main characteristics at one 
accounting year before the strategy change announcement date and show regression 
results of testing the four hypotheses in Section 4.3.  
 
In Tables 4.1 to 4.9, all variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to 
minimize potential detrimental effect of outliers. Variable definitions are reported in 
Appendix 4.7. Tables 4.2 to 4.9 also include size, book to market of equity, volatility, 
turnover, accruals and momentum factor as control variables (Jegadeesh and Wu, 
2013). According to Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), risky firms tend to state the potential 
consequences for the risk that they take compared to safe firms. Likewise, firms with 
recent poor performance are likely to explain the reasons for such performance. As a 
result, tones of analyst reports can be affected by different firm-specific factors. This 
chapter includes firm-specific factors such as size, book to market, momentum, 
volatility, turnover and accruals. Size and volatility measure the risk of firms. Riskier 
firms tend to have more negative tone. Book to market ratio indicates growth or value 
firms. Growth firms tend to be more cautious with the information they disclose to the 
public. Accruals represent changes in working capital. This may be caused by bad 
business conditions or earning manipulation. Turnover measures whether a particular 
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stock is attractive to investors. Momentum is a proxy for recent industry stock 
performance and thus is also included. These variables are measured at one accounting 
year before the strategy change announcement date.  
 
The announcement day returns are also included since analysts are more likely to react 
to the price movement at the announcement dates. Furthermore, analysts’ estimation 
of target prices might be changed in analyst reports and thus change in target prices is 
included as a control variable.  
 
 
 
4.5.1. Summary Statistics  
 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of firms’ main characteristics and information 
included in analyst reports. Mean and median of market value is USD4.31 billion and 
USD1.78 billion respectively, indicating that some sample firms have high market 
value and thus a high standard deviation (USD5.38 billion). Mean, standard deviation 
and median of size show consistent values. Mean and median of book to market ratios 
are smaller than 1 (0.436 and 0.344) and indicate higher market value of equity relative 
to book value of equity. Mean and median of volatility are 0.086 and 0.071, 
respectively, indicating that the change of stock returns is 8.6% on average over the 
last 60 months before the announcement date. Mean and median of turnover are 0.653 
and 0.592, respectively. Mean and median of accruals are 0.094 and 0.062, 
respectively.  
 
- Insert Table 4.1 about here - 
 
Table 4.1 also includes momentum which is a monthly data downloaded from Kenneth 
R. French Data Library and is matched with the event month. Mean and median of 
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momentum are 0.002 and 0.001, respectively. This indicates that industry stock prices 
of event firms keep increasing before the announcement date. Recommendation 
change dummy shows that 26.1% of analysts change their recommendation of firms’ 
stocks after the strange change announcement date. At the same time, analysts’ 
forecasting of target price and EPS increase by 4% and 2.6% respectively, implying 
higher expectation of strategic operations in the analyst reports. 
 
4.5.2. Tones in Analyst Reports 
 
Tables 4.2 to 4.5 show the regression results of positive and negative weight powers 
on the stock price movement. The dependent variable is the market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns over a 4-day period after the announcement date (i.e., 
CAR [0, 3]) (Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013). Year fixed 
effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are also included, but the coefficient 
estimates are not reported to preserve space.  
 
Models 1 and 3 in Table 4.2 show that coefficients of positive weight powers are 
significant at the 10-percent level. This indicates that the occurrence of positive words 
in analyst reports have some incremental predicting power for explaining stock 
returns. In other words, higher weight power for positive words is associated with 
higher abnormal returns after the announcement date. Models 2 and 3 also show that 
negative weight power exhibits incremental explanatory power stock returns: their 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 5-percent level. It suggests that higher 
occurrence of negative words tends to have more negative returns. These findings are 
consistent with my first hypothesis that positive and negative words in analyst reports 
tend to provide incremental power for explaining stock returns after the strategy 
change announcement date.  
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- Insert Table 4.2 about here - 
 
If comparing positive versus negative words, Table 4.2 shows that coefficients (2.796 
versus 1.089) and significance (5-percent versus 10-percent level) of the negative 
weight power are higher relative to the positive weight power. In line with Hypothesis 
2, the incremental predicting power of negative words tends to be higher compared 
with positive words. In other words, market participants react more strongly to 
negative words in the analyst reports relative to positive words. These findings are 
consistent with Asquith et al. (2005) and Huang et al. (2014). Size, momentum and 
accruals are negatively associated with stock returns and book to market, 
announcement day return and change in target prices are positively correlated with 
stock returns. Stock prices are more likely to increase when analysts increase their 
target price estimation in analyst reports.  
 
Next, I include two examples to introduce the process of classifying the “more” and 
“less” informative strategy change announcements, explain the two corresponding 
sub-sample sizes and investigate different effects of positive and negative words in 
analyst reports. 
 
It is under managers’ discretion whether the disclosed strategy change announcements 
are more informative or less informative. The informative discretionary disclosure is 
found to be associated with lower cost of capital, better stock performance and smaller 
information asymmetry (Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bens and 
Monahan, 2004 and Ferreira and Rezende, 2007). As a result, when managers plan to 
encourage investments in a particular strategic direction, they are likely to reveal the 
private information on their corporate strategies. 
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First, more informative announcements include detailed processes to implement 
changed/new strategies. For example, people separately used smartphones and laptops 
before 2010, thus Apple Inc. announced a new strategy about developing a new mobile 
device that sit between smartphone and laptop. People are able to use the new mobile 
device to browse websites, display electronic books and play games. In 2010, Apple 
Inc. introduced an electronic tablet called “IPad” and believes that it is more capable 
than a smart phone and at the same time more intimate than a laptop. Reuters News 
(2010) conducted an online poll to more than 1,000 respondents. Nearly 30% of 
respondents had no interest in IPad, 37% of respondents were willing to buy IPad for 
500 to 699 USD and 20% would pay 700 to 899 USD. On the releasing date, the sale 
price of IPAD was announced to be 499 USD. Apple Inc estimated to sell up to 4 
million IPads in the first year and expected to generate sales of more than 4 billion 
USD in 2011 (Dow Jones Institutional News, 2010). The news about Apple Inc’s new 
strategy includes a detailed description of the appearance and capacity of IPad and 
summarizes the market research of the price that consumers are willing to pay for 
before releasing. It also includes an estimation of annual sales of IPad after announcing 
the price. It further provides information about the profitability of Apple iPad's 3G 
services cooperated with its partner AT&T Inc. Therefore, I rate the strategy change 
announcement of Apple Inc as 10/10 for the highest level of informative disclosures 
and classify Apple Inc. and other similar firms as event firms with “more informative” 
strategy change announcements. 
 
Less informative announcements may only state their strategies in terms of goals that 
they wish to achieve without a detailed description of the implementation steps. For 
example, Financial News (2012) shows that Tower Watson planned to adjust their 
strategies in an economy where the scarcity was an increasingly common 
phenomenon. Tower Watson also mentioned some targets including providing growth, 
introducing new technologies and hedging against future inflation. Nevertheless, the 
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company did not include detailed implementation steps in the news. Therefore, I rate 
the strategy change announcement of Tower Watson as 3/10 for the low level of 
informative disclosures and classify this firm and other similar firms as event firms 
with “less informative” strategy change announcement. 
 
Second for the two sub-samples, each event may have more than one FACTIVA news 
on the event date. Thus, 562 FACTIVA news reports are collected for 133 event firms. 
To investigate the effect of informativeness on stock performance, I combine different 
reports of one announcement into one news item and then divide the 133 news items 
into “more or less informative” strategy change announcements. In this chapter, I 
depend on the median grade of informativeness of the 133 news and thus I divide the 
full sample into two halves. News of 67 firms are classified as more informative 
strategy change announcements and the remaining 66 are classified as less informative 
announcements.   
 
Table 4.3 reports the results for the 67 event firms with more informative strategy 
change announcements. The 67 firms have 439 analyst reports. Coefficients of 
positive weight power are more significant (at the 5-percent level) compared with 
coefficients in Table 4.2 while coefficients of negative weight power are less 
significant relative to Table 4.2. One explanation is that more informative strategy 
change announcements provide additional information to the market to make better 
evaluation, and thus enhance the predicting power of positive words. The more 
informative strategy change announcements disclose more information in terms of 
detailed process to implement their strategies and include detailed steps to achieve 
their goals. In line with Hypothesis 3a, my findings suggest that when strategy change 
announcements are more informative, higher occurrence of influential positive words 
in analyst reports exhibit more positive abnormal returns. 
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- Insert Table 4.3 about here - 
 
Table 4.4 reports regression results for the 66 firms with less informative strategy 
change announcements. These 66 firms have 282 analyst reports. Coefficients of 
positive weight power become insignificant due to less information disclosed. 
Nevertheless, coefficients of negative weight power are more statistically significant 
(at the 5-percent level) relative to Table 4.3. As firms usually only list their goals 
without showing market their implement approaches, the market might be very 
reluctant to trust all the positive things promised by the firm. In contrast, the market 
tends to evaluate more thoroughly potential risks that firms might face when negative 
words are included. Therefore, in line with Hypothesis 3b, my findings indicate that 
higher occurrence of influential negative words in analyst reports exhibit larger 
negative stock reactions when strategy change announcements are less informative. 
 
- Insert Table 4.4 about here - 
 
Additionally, firms that have strategy change announcements at one year are more 
likely to have different news last year (e.g., sales growth, charity, lawsuits and layoffs). 
Analysts would then evaluate the news based on their information about the event 
firms and their corresponding industry specific factors. To differentiate the effect of 
strategy change announcements versus other types of analyst reports. I examine the 
impact of change in tones of analyst reports over different years. 
 
Table 4.5 reports the change in tone of analyst reports between time t with strategy 
change announcements and time t-1 without strategy change announcements by using 
the following regression: 
∆r𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 × ∆𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐 × 𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝑑 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 
                                   +𝑓 × 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑔 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                        (4.6) 
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Note that the score in the Equation (4.6) is estimated using the one-stage regression. 
That is, I estimate the weightings for scoret and scoret-1 by using the estimation steps 
from Equations (4.2) to (4.4) and then calculate the two scores by using the Equation 
(4.1).  
 
Table 4.5 reports results of regressing change in CAR [0, 3] on change in positive 
or/and negative weight powers. I use change in CAR [0, 3] rather than CAR [0, 3] as 
the dependant variable to eliminate the time effect of last analyst reports on stock 
prices. In other words, change in CAR [0, 3] captures the adjusted abnormal stock 
price movement over different time periods. I find that coefficients of change in 
positive word weight power are positive but not significant in models 1 and 3. This 
indicates that change in stock returns is not associated with change in positive word 
weight power. Nevertheless, coefficients of change in negative weight power are 
negative and significant (at 5-percent level). This suggests that a 1% increase in 
negative word weight power (i.e., negative score is less negative) exhibits 1.38% 
higher abnormal returns, assuming all other factors remain constant. Thus, it appears 
investors focus more on the inclusion of negative words in analyst reports because 
analysts have access to more financial information and are generally more skillful in 
identifying risk. 
 
- Insert Table 4.5 about here - 
 
Next, I study the effects of positive and negative weight powers on event firms’ trading 
volume. In Table 4.6, to avoid the January effect, the dependent variable is the average 
fraction of shares traded over the period [0, 3] minus the fraction over the same length 
but at 1 year ago (i.e., average fraction of shares traded over the period [-365, -362]). 
Same control variables except for turnover are included in the table, as turnover is just 
another measure of the trading volume. Therefore, I investigate the change in trading 
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volume around the strategy change announcement date between year t and t-1 by using 
the following regression, 
∆V𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽 × 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑏 × 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐 × 𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝑑 × 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
+𝑒 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖  + 𝑓 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑔 × 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑎𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 
                                            +ℎ × 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                   (4.7) 
 
Table 4.6 shows that coefficients of positive weight power are positive and significant 
(at the 5-percent level) and indicates that higher occurrence of positive words in 
analyst reports is associated with higher stock trading volume. Negative weight power 
also has positive coefficients but is only significant in Model 2. However, coefficient 
(1.045 versus 5.045) and significance (at the 10-percent versus the 5-percent level) of 
negative weight power are smaller relative to the positive weight power. This suggests 
that higher weights in negative words tend to have higher trading volume but the effect 
is small relative to positive words.  
 
- Insert Table 4.6 about here - 
 
Two control variables (i.e., momentum and announcement day return) have similar 
coefficients relative to Table 4.2. However, size is positively correlated with trading 
volume, indicating that large firms tend to have higher trading volume. Coefficients 
of volatility are positive and imply higher trading volume for firms with high stock 
variation. Coefficients of book to market, accruals and change in target prices are 
negative but not significant.  
 
Overall, this section finds that higher occurrence of influential positive (negative) 
words in analyst reports exhibit more positive (negative) stock performance. 
Furthermore, I find that when strategy change announcements are more informative, 
positive words in analyst reports have more positive abnormal returns. It indicates 
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market’s confidence in positive words included in analyst reports. Nevertheless, 
negative words are associated with more negative stock reaction when the 
announcements are less informative. It is because of more attention to negative 
information by market participants. In addition, both positive and negative words are 
associated with higher trading volume and the effect is higher for positive words 
relative to negative words.  
 
4.5.3. Tones in Analyst Reports versus Annual Reports 
 
Strategy change announcements are soft talk information and contain firms’ direction 
in terms of long-term development and operation. However, the qualitative soft talk 
information is harder to evaluate and absorb. To investigate whether market 
participants rely on analysts’ industrial knowledge and analytical skills, analyst reports 
are compared against annual reports. The event dates for the 721 analyst reports refer 
to the initial public announcement dates in FACTIVA. The event dates for the 133 
annual reports are the firms’ fiscal year ending dates which are exactly after the 
corresponding initial FACTIVA news dates. 
 
Table 4.7 reports the results and I exclude change in target prices as a control variable 
as it is unavailable in annual reports. Model 1 shows that coefficients of positive words 
are positive and not significant, indicating that positive words in annual reports tend 
to not affect stock returns. Analyst report dummy is negative and significant at the 1-
percent level. It suggests that analyst reports have a negative impact on abnormal 
returns relative to annual reports because they may include negative information 
which are excluded in annual reports. Compared with annual reports, higher weights 
of positive words in analyst reports are associated with higher stock returns: the 
interaction term ‘Positive Weight Power * Analyst Report Dummy’ is positive and 
significant at the 5-percent level. The total effect (‘Positive Weight Power’ + ‘Positive 
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Weight Power * Analyst Report Dummy’) is also positive and significant. This 
suggests that market participants are reluctant to trust positive things promised by 
managers. They rather rely more on analysts’ industrial knowledge and analytical 
skills.  
 
- Insert Table 4.7 about here - 
 
Model 2 in Table 4.7 shows that coefficients of negative weight power and the 
interaction term ‘Negative Weight Power * Analyst Report Dummy’ are positive and 
significant at the 5-percent level. The total effect (‘Negative Weight Power’ + 
‘Negative Weight Power * Analyst Report Dummy’) for negative words in analyst 
reports is also positive and significant. These findings suggest that higher weights of 
negative words in both annual and analyst reports are associated with more negative 
stock performance. The impact is stronger for negative words in analyst reports.  
Model 3 include both positive and negative weight powers and show consistent results. 
 
In summary, results in Table 4.7 support Hypothesis 4 that positive and negative words 
in analyst reports tend to have stronger market reactions relative to that in annual 
reports. In particular, analysts are more reliable for propagating bad news and 
investigating the potential risks and challenges that companies may face when event 
firms change their current strategies or announce a new strategy.  
 
4.5.4. Robustness Check 
 
Finally, I conduct one robustness check of positive and negative words in analyst 
reports by using different word lists. In Tables 4.2 to 4.7, I use the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) lexicon to estimate positive and negative weight powers. In Table 
4.8, I use the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N lexicon. In line with Table 
4.2, results are similar and thus are robust. Nevertheless, Table 4.8 show that positive 
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and negative weight powers have positive but smaller coefficients relative to Table 
4.2. It suggests that both positive and negative words have smaller incremental 
predicating power on stock returns as the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N 
word list include some misclassified words. These misclassified words like capital, 
board, cost and liability are neither positive nor negative in financial contents. Overall, 
these findings provide evidence to support Loughran and McDonald (2011) that their 
word list can better reflect the tone in financial contents.  
 
- Insert Table 4.8 about here - 
 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter uses the approach proposed by Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) to investigate 
the impact of positive and negative words in analyst reports on the stock price around 
the strategy change announcement date. I include 721 analyst reports for 133 firms 
from 2010 to 2015. Overall, the chapter finds that both positive and negative words in 
analyst reports have incremental predicting powers on stock returns. Higher 
occurrence in positive (negative) words are associated with more positive (negative) 
abnormal returns. The results are robust after changing the Loughran and McDonald’s 
(2011) lexicon to the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N word list. 
 
Further, impacts of positive and negative words differ in more versus less information 
strategy change announcements. This chapter shows that higher occurrence of 
influential positive (negative) words in analyst reports leads to more positive 
(negative) stock returns when strategy change announcements are more (less) 
informative. This suggests that market participants trust positive tones of analyst 
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reports when announcements are more informative. For less informative 
announcements, they emphasize more on negative tones and do not pay much attention 
to positive ones. I confirm these findings by showing that increasing occurrence of 
positive words have no effect on abnormal returns over different time periods. 
Nevertheless, increasing occurrence of negative words are associated with decreasing 
stock performance. This further confirms that the market pays more attention to 
negative information included by analysts.  
 
In addition, this chapter shows that higher occurrence of positive and negative words 
both exhibit larger trading volume. Nevertheless, the effect is stronger for positive 
words relative to negative words. This chapter also compares words in analyst reports 
versus annual reports in terms of strategy change announcements. Both positive and 
negative words in analyst reports are associated with higher impacts on abnormal 
returns (i.e., more positive and more negative) relative to annual reports. It indicates 
that market participants rely more on analyst reports because analysts are important in 
propagating bad news and investigating firms’ potential risks and challenges when 
firms announce changed/new strategies. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Variable Definition   
Variable Definition Source 
Accruals 
One-year change in current assets 
excluding cash minus change in current 
liabilities excluding long-term debt in 
current liabilities and taxes payable 
minus depreciation divided by average 
total assets. Based on Jegadeesh and 
Wu (2013). 
COMPUSTAT;              
CRSP                 
Analyst Report 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equals to 1 for 
analyst reports and 0 for annual reports. 
Hand 
Collection 
Announcement Day 
Return 
The abnormal return at the event date. CRSP          
AR 
The daily difference between the raw 
return of a firm and the expected return 
(i.e., S&P500).  
CRSP;                   
DataStream 
Book to Market 
Book value of equity divided by the 
market capitalization at one accounting 
year before the strategy change 
announcement date.     
COMPUSTAT;              
CRSP                 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal returns for a firm 
over a period of time. 
CRSP;                   
DataStream 
Change in Negative 
Weight Power 
The difference in negative weight 
power of analyst reports for event firms 
with strategy change announcements 
versus without announcements at 1 year 
ago. 
CRSP;           
Hand 
Collection 
Change in Positive 
Weight Power 
The difference in positive weight power 
of analyst reports for event firms with 
strategy change announcements versus 
without announcements at 1 year ago. 
CRSP;           
Hand 
Collection 
Change in Trading 
Volume 
The average fraction of shares traded 
over the period [0, 3] minus the fraction 
over the same length but at 1 year ago. 
Date 0 denotes the strategy change 
announcement date. 
CRSP 
EPS Forecast Change 
The percentage change of EPS fore-
casting in analyst reports. 
Hand 
Collection 
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Variable Definition Source 
 
Informative 
Announcement 
Dummy variable equals to 1 when 
event firms provide with detailed 
information about strategy change 
announcements and 0 otherwise. 
Hand 
Collection 
Momentum 
The difference between the monthly 
average return of the two high prior 
return portfolios and the monthly 
average return of the two low prior 
return portfolios. It is denoted as, 
Momentum = 1/2*(Small High + Big 
High) – 1/2*(Small Low + Big Low). It 
is positive in case prices keep 
increasing and negative in case prices 
keep decreasing. Based on Kenneth R. 
French - Data Library. 
Kenneth R. 
French - Data 
Library 
Recommendation 
Change Dummy 
Dummy variable equals to 1 in case the 
analysts change their recommendation 
(buy, sell or hold) of a firm in analyst 
reports and 0 otherwise. 
Hand 
Collection 
Size 
Natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity at one accounting year before 
the strategy change announcement date. 
COMPUSTAT;              
CRSP                 
Target Price Change 
The percentage change of target price 
estimation in analyst reports. 
Hand 
Collection 
Turnover 
The natural logarithm of the number of 
shares trading during the period from 6 
to 252 trading days before the event 
date divided by the number of shares 
outstanding on the filing date. Based on 
Jegadeesh and Wu (2013). 
CRSP 
Volatility 
The standard deviation of the firm-
specific component of returns that are 
estimated using up to 60 months of 
data. Based on Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013). 
CRSP 
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Table 4.1 – Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of my sample over the period 2010-2015. 
The sample consists of 133 event firms and 721 analyst reports. The event firms 
are companies that announce strategy change announcements during the sample 
period. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. All variables are 
estimated at one accounting year before the announcement date. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Median 
Market Value (million USD) 4307.2 5382.6 1777.3 
Size 7.550 1.616 7.482 
Book to Market 0.436 0.381 0.344 
Momentum 0.002 0.024 0.001 
Volatility 0.086 0.089 0.071 
Turnover 0.653 0.934 0.592 
Accruals 0.094 0.171 0.062 
Recommendation Change Dummy 0.261 0.440 0 
Target Price Change  0.040 0.104 0.031 
EPS Forecast Change 0.026 0.082 0.001 
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Table 4.2 – Strategy Change Announcement Period Abnormal Returns  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 
using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is 
CAR [0, 3]. The sample consists of 721 analyst reports from 133 event firms. 
Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in 
parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of outliers. The 
first 6 control variables are estimated at one accounting year before the strategy 
change announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 
industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, 
** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 
 (-0.300) (-0.720) (-0.615) 
Positive Weight Power 1.094*  1.089* 
 (1.908)  (1.892) 
Negative Weight Power  2.211** 2.796** 
  (2.479) (2.315) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 (-5.280) (-5.013) (-5.192) 
Book to Market 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 
 (3.226) (3.181) (3.217) 
Momentum -1.431*** -1.344*** -1.520*** 
 (-4.126) (-4.223) (-4.046) 
Volatility 0.710 0.886 0.929 
 (0.687) (0.658) (0.694) 
Turnover 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (1.389) (1.507) (1.382) 
Accruals -0.514*** -0.611*** -0.646*** 
 (-2.892) (-2.863) (-2.885) 
Announcement Day Return 0.612** 0.705*** 0.681** 
 (2.573) (2.615) (2.563) 
Target Price Change 0.145** 0.136** 0.185** 
 (2.575) (2.394) (2.572) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 721 721 721 
R2 0.158 0.157 0.158 
F 5.620 6.970 5.350 
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Table 4.3 – More Informative Strategy Change Announcements  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 using 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. 
The sample consists of 439 analyst reports from 67 event firms with more informative 
strategy change announcements. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and t-
statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.7 and 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential detrimental effect of 
outliers. The first 6 control variables are estimated at one accounting year before the 
strategy change announcement date. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry 
effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.017 -0.013 -0.021 
 (-0.528) (-0.316) (-0.629) 
Positive Weight Power 0.971**  0.868* 
 (2.117)  (1.901) 
Negative Weight Power  0.849* 0.370* 
  (1.936) (1.816) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.636) (-4.389) (-4.547) 
Book to Market 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
 (3.846) (3.812) (3.812) 
Momentum -1.251*** -1.175*** -1.345*** 
 (-3.447) (-3.442) (-3.358) 
Volatility 1.248 1.103 1.345 
 (0.568) (0.543) (0.564) 
Turnover -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
 (-0.350) (-0.322) (-0.345) 
Accruals -0.248 -0.291 -0.349 
 (-1.237) (-1.196) (-1.237) 
Announcement Day Return 1.146*** 1.276*** 1.347*** 
 (3.178) (3.222) (3.165) 
Target Price Change 0.160*** 0.149** 0.180*** 
 (2.593) (2.384) (2.579) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 439 439 439 
R2 0.159 0.158 0.159 
F 4.310 5.150 4.220 
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Table 4.4 – Less Informative Strategy Change Announcements  
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 
using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is CAR 
[0, 3]. The sample consists of 282 analyst reports from 66 event firm with less 
informative strategy change announcements. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold 
and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.7 
and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential detrimental 
effect of outliers. The first 6 control variables are estimated at one accounting year 
before the strategy change announcement date. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 
12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, 
** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.216 0.197 0.182 
 (1.651) (1.532) (1.470) 
Positive Weight Power 0.687  0.731 
 (1.507)  (1.369) 
Negative Weight Power  1.023** 1.240** 
  (2.061) (2.075) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (-6.213) (-3.362) (-3.429) 
Book to Market -0.028 -0.026 -0.024 
 (-0.466) (-0.436) (-0.394) 
Momentum -9.715** -7.727 -8.440 
 (-2.361) (-1.506) (-1.483) 
Volatility -1.126 -1.070 -1.191 
 (-0.429) (-0.371) (-0.376) 
Turnover 0.047*** 0.037** 0.035** 
 (3.486) (2.106) (2.093) 
Accruals -2.856*** -2.274*** -2.669*** 
 (-7.512) (-5.057) (-5.038) 
Announcement Day Return -0.351 -0.294 -0.370 
 (-0.465) (-0.395) (-0.430) 
Target Price Change -0.118 -0.123 -0.105 
 (-0.698) (-0.916) (-0.701) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 282 282 282 
R2 0.147 0.176 0.166 
F 6.850 8.630 7.610 
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Table 4.5 – Analyst Reports Tone Change 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 using 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is the difference 
between CAR [0, 3] and the CAR over the same period but at 1 year ago. The sample 
consists of 721 analyst reports from 133 event firms. Coefficient estimates are shown 
in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential 
detrimental effect of outliers. The first 6 control variables are estimated at one 
accounting year before the strategy change announcement date. Year fixed effects and 
Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not 
reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables:                              
Change in CAR [0, 3] 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.010 0.032** 0.030* 
 (0.770) (2.049) (1.892) 
Change in Positive Weight Power 1.051  0.857 
 (1.341)  (1.127) 
Change in Negative Weight Power  1.384** 1.298** 
  (2.045) (1.971) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.021) (-3.949) (-4.100) 
Book to Market 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (3.533) (3.759) (3.746) 
Momentum -0.216 -0.258 -0.265 
 (-1.313) (-1.347) (-1.373) 
Volatility -0.273 -0.646 -0.478 
 (-0.325) (-0.803) (-0.570) 
Turnover 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 (0.565) (0.773) (0.680) 
Accruals -0.233 -0.185 -0.194 
 (-1.213) (-0.967) (-0.964) 
Announcement Day Return 0.759*** 0.825*** 0.870*** 
 (3.394) (3.535) (3.550) 
Target Price Change 0.328*** 0.223*** 0.334*** 
 (3.183) (3.124) (3.189) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 721 721 721 
R2 0.097 0.141 0.141 
F 2.170 2.430 2.870 
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Table 4.6 – Strategy Change Announcement Period Trading Volume 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 
using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is 
the difference between average fraction of shares traded over period [0,3] and 
the fraction over the same period but at 1 year ago. The sample consists of 721 
analyst reports from 133 event firms. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold 
and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the 
potential detrimental effect of outliers. The first 5 control variables are estimated 
at one accounting year before the strategy change announcement date. Year 
fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included, but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables:                       
Change in Volume 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme       
Constant -0.004 -0.007* -0.003 
 (-1.439) (-1.740) (-1.541) 
Positive Weight Power 5.045**   4.136** 
 (2.330)   (2.313) 
Negative Weight Power   1.045* 0.903 
   (1.909) (1.553) 
Control Variables       
Size 0.0003* 0.0004** 0.0003* 
 (1.903) (2.492) (1.931) 
Book to Market -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0007 
 (-0.508) (-0.672) (-0.535) 
Momentum -0.133** -0.129** -0.144** 
 (-2.144) (-2.172) (-2.154) 
Volatility 0.214** 0.303** 0.198** 
 (2.328) (2.515) (2.442) 
Accruals 0.019 0.015 0.014 
 (0.608) (0.544) (0.562) 
Announcement Day Return 0.128** 0.167** 0.109** 
 (2.371) (2.469) (2.384) 
Target Price Change -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 
 (-0.368) (-0.626) (-0.370) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 721 721 721 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.098 0.123 
F 3.790 3.180 3.420 
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Table 4.7 – Analyst Reports versus Annual Reports 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 using the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) lexicon. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 3]. The 
sample consists of 721 analyst reports and 133 annual reports. Coefficient estimates are 
shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential 
detrimental effect of outliers. The first 6 control variables are estimated at one accounting 
year before the strategy change announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 
industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant 0.014 0.013 0.021 
 (1.083) (1.029) (1.548) 
Positive Weight Power 1.104  1.973 
 (1.390)  (1.112) 
Negative Weight Power  1.937** 1.495** 
 
 (2.166) (2.010) 
Analyst Report Dummy -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.049*** 
 (-4.292) (-4.172) (-5.049) 
Positive Weight Power* 1.581**  2.744** 
Analyst Report Dummy (2.029)  (1.989) 
Negative Weight Power*  2.974** 3.469** 
Analyst Report Dummy  (2.222) (1.992) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.552) (-4.358) (-4.963) 
Book to Market 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (4.459) (4.145) (4.341) 
Momentum -0.841*** -0.818*** -0.969*** 
 (-4.072) (-4.406) (-5.361) 
Volatility 0.992 0.959 1.038 
 (1.318) (1.280) (1.369) 
Turnover 0.006 0.007 0.004 
 (1.559) (1.564) (1.386) 
Accruals -0.168 -0.170 -0.229** 
 (-1.255) (-1.322) (-2.017) 
Announcement Day Return 1.247*** 1.241*** 1.199*** 
 (5.639) (5.579) (5.410) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (Analyst +                         
854 854 854 
Annual Reports) 
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.163 0.185 
F 5.560 6.160 6.900 
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Table 4.8 – Event Period Abnormal Returns: Different Word Lists 
This table reports the regression results of my sample over the period 2010-2015 using the 
Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary H4N lexicon. The dependent variable is CAR [0, 
3]. The sample consists of 721 analyst reports from 133 event firms. Coefficient estimates 
are shown in bold and t-statistics are displayed in parenthesis. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.7 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to minimise the potential 
detrimental effect of outliers. The first 6 control variables are estimated at one accounting 
year before the strategy change announcement date. T-statistics are calculated using White 
(1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 
industry effects are included, but the coefficient estimates are not reported. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variables: CAR [0, 3] Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Term Weighting Scheme    
Constant -0.019 -0.016 -0.018 
 (-1.143) (-1.058) (-1.132) 
Positive Weight Power 0.368*  0.371* 
 (1.894)  (1.790) 
Negative Weight Power  0.423** 0.366** 
  (2.033) (1.978) 
Control Variables    
Size -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-5.251) (-5.000) (-5.230) 
Book to Market 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (3.889) (3.842) (3.876) 
Momentum -1.132*** -1.580*** -1.041*** 
 (-4.160) (-4.875) (-4.135) 
Volatility 1.467 0.922 1.177 
 (1.134) (1.102) (1.139) 
Turnover 0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 
 (1.794) (1.699) (1.777) 
Accruals -0.651*** -0.571*** -0.552*** 
 (-2.624) (-2.680) (-2.627) 
Announcement Day Return 0.813** 0.941*** 0.711*** 
 (2.929) (2.971) (2.918) 
Target Price Change 0.153*** 0.094** 0.113*** 
 (2.609) (2.293) (2.613) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
# Observations (News Articles) 721 721 721 
R2 0.116 0.128 0.129 
F 3.750 4.210 4.040 
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Chapter Five 
General Conclusion and Further Research  
 
The thesis presents discussions concerning firm characteristics of firms that announce 
changed/new strategies, short-term stock performance and effects of contents in 
FACTIVA news and analyst reports on stock price movement after the announcement 
date.  
 
The main aim of Chapter Two is to explore firm characteristics of firms with strategy 
change announcements and the followed stock market reaction and long-term firm 
performance. First, my analysis shows that event firms have less competitive operating 
activities, higher financial distress risk, lower market expectations but higher growth 
prospects. Second, I find that event firms are associated with significantly positive 
stock performance around the announcement date. Third, event firms exhibit better 
operating performance, high long-term growth potential, improved liquidation and 
smaller financial distress risk at one accounting year after announcements. At the same 
time, they keep expanding their products and services from before to after the 
announcement date.  
 
Chapter Three mainly investigates the impact of positive and negative words in the 
FACTIVA news reports of strategy change announcements on stock prices. Overall, 
my findings show that higher occurrence of influential positive (negative) words in 
FACTIVA news exhibit more positive (negative) stock reaction. Further, effects of 
positive (negative) words are stronger when announcements are more (less) 
informative. At the same time, increasing occurrence of positive (negative) words are 
associated with rising (dropping) abnormal returns over different time periods. In 
addition, I find that market participants have similar reaction to positive tones of 
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FACTIVA news relative to annual reports. Nevertheless, higher weights of negative 
words in annual reports have more negative abnormal returns.  
 
Chapter Four also mainly explores the effects of positive and negative words on stock 
performance, but for analyst reports. This chapter first shows that, overall, higher 
weights of positive (negative) words in analyst reports are associated with more 
positive (negative) abnormal returns. Second, I find that higher occurrence of 
influential positive (negative) words leads to more positive (negative) stock returns 
when strategy change announcements are more (less) informative. Third, I show that 
increasing occurrence of positive words have no effect on abnormal returns over 
different time periods. Nevertheless, increasing weights of negative words exhibit 
decreasing stock performance. Fourth, increasing occurrence of influential positive 
and negative words are associated with higher trading volume while the effect is 
stronger for positive words relative to negative words. Finally, my analysis shows that 
positive and negative words in analyst reports have higher impacts on abnormal 
returns (i.e., more positive and more negative) relative to annual reports.  
 
Further research may improve the analysis in several aspects. This thesis focuses on 
United States headquartered firms with strategy change announcements to enhance the 
comparisons concerning firms with similar business environments. First, one can 
conduct the future research on the European headquartered firms that have announced 
changed/new strategies. The purpose is to compare the effects of positive and negative 
words that are included in FACTIVA news, annual reports or analyst reports on the 
stock prices of firms headquartered in United States relative to European countries. 
Second, it may be valuable to further compare United States versus European 
headquartered firms that expand locally and internationally. 
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Third, this thesis also highlights differences in the market perceptions between 
positive versus negative tones. More specifically, it might be valuable to identify the 
positive and negative words that are associated with the largest possible market 
reactions. Finally, expansion is one of the most frequently used strategies and thus 
future research can investigate market response to the news of firms’ expansion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
123 
 
Bibliography 
 
Agrawal, A., Chen, M. (2008), “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock 
Recommendations”. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 51, pp.503-537. 
 
Altman, E.I. (1968), “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 23 (4), pp.189-209. 
 
Antweiler, W., and Frank, M. Z. (2004), “Is All That Talk Just Noise? The Information 
Content of Interent Stock Message Boards”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp.1259-
1294. 
 
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M. and Au A. S. (2005), “Information Content of Equity Analyst 
Reports”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 75 (2), pp.245–282. 
 
Bagnoli M, Levine S. and Watts S. (2005a), “Analyst Estimation Revision Clusters 
and Corporate Events”. Part I, Annals of Finance, Vol. 1: pp.245-265. 
 
Bagnoli M, Levine S. and Watts S. (2005b), “Analyst Estimation Revision Clusters 
and Corporate Events”. Part II, Annals of Finance, Vol. 1: pp.379-393. 
 
Bens, D. A. and Monahan, S. J. (2004), “Disclosure Quality and the Excess Value of 
Diversification”. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42 (4), pp.691-730. 
 
Botosan, C. (1997), “Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital”. The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 72, pp.323-350. 
 
124 
 
Bradshaw, M. (2011), “Analysts’ Forecasts: What do We Know after Decades of 
Work?” Working paper, Boston College. Accessed on February 19, 2015. Available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880339. 
 
Breton, G. and Taffler, R. J. (2001), “Accounting Information and Analyst Stock 
Recommendation Decisions: A Content Analysis Approach”. Accounting and 
Business Research, Vol. 31 (2), pp.91-101. 
 
Das, S., Levine, C. B. and Sivaramakrishnan, K. (1998), “Earnings Predictability and 
Bias in Analysts’ Earnings Forecast” The Accounting Review, Vol. 73 (2), pp.277-
294. 
 
Dougal, C., Engelberg, J., Garcia, D. and Parsons, C. A. (2012), “Journalists and the 
Stock Market”. Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 25 (3), pp.639-679. 
 
Dow Jones News Service (2010), “Market Talk: Apple's IPad Could Rack Up $4.6B 
In CY11 Sales”. Retrieved 15 January, 2012, from Factiva database.  
 
Drake, M., Rees, L., Swanson, E. (2011), “Trading Against the Prophets: Using Short 
Interest to Profit from Analyst Recommendations”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 86, 
pp.101-130. 
 
Epstein, L. G. and Echneider, M. (2008), “Ambiguity, Information Quality, and Asset 
Pricing”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 63 (1), pp.197-228. 
 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993), “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks 
and bonds”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33(1), pp.3-56. 
 
125 
 
Feldman, R., Govindaraj, S., Livnat, J. and Segal, B. (2010), “Management’s Tone 
Change, Post Earnings Announcement Drift and Accruals”. Review of Accounting 
Studies, Vol. 15(4), pp.915-953. 
 
Ferguson, T. D., Deephouse, D., Ferguson, W. L. (2000), “Do Strategic Groups Differ 
in Reputation?” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, pp.1195-1214. 
 
Ferreira, D. and Rezende, M. (2007), “Corporate strategy and information disclosure”. 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 38 (1), pp.164-184. 
 
Financial News (2012), “Towers Watson Offers ‘Roots’ to Long-Term Prosperity; 
The Consultancy is Advising Clients to Adjust their Strategies for an Economy in 
which Scarcity is an Increasingly Widespread Phenomenon”. Retrieved 18 January, 
2012, from Factiva database. 
 
Fombrun, C.F., Van Riel, C.B.M. (2004), “Fame and Fortune, How Successful 
Companies Build Winning Reputations”. Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall. 
 
Grant R. M. (2010), “Contemporary strategy analysis”. Seventh Edition, Chichester, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Groysberg, B., Healy, P., Maber, D. (2011), “What Drives Sell-Side Analyst 
Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?” Journal of Accounting Research, 
Vol. 49, pp.969-1000. 
 
Hirst, D.E., Koonce, L. and Miller, J. (1999), “The Joint Affect of Management’s Prior 
Forecast Accuracy and the form of its Financial Forecast on Investor Judgements”. 
Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, pp.1-24. 
126 
 
Hoberg, G., Philips, G. and Prabhala, N. (2014), “Product Market Threats, Payouts, 
and Financial Flexibility”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 69 (1): pp.293-324. 
 
Hong, H., Lim, T. and Stein, J. C. (2000), “Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst 
Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 
(1), pp.265-294. 
 
Huang, A. H., Zang, A. Y. and Zheng R. (2014), “Evidence on the Information Content 
of Text in Analyst Reports”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 89, pp.2151-2180. 
 
Hutton A., Miller G. and Skinner D. (2003), “The Role of Supplementary Statements 
with Management Earnings Forecasts”. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41 (5), 
pp.867-890. 
 
Jegadeesh, N. and Wu, D. (2013), “Word Power: A New Approach for Content 
Analysis”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 110, pp.712-729. 
 
Jones, E. and Danbolt, J. and Hirst, I. (2004), “Company investment announcements 
and the market value of the firm”. European Journal of Finance, Vol. 10 (5), pp.437-
452. 
 
Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (2002), “Exploring Corporate Strategy”. Seventh Edition, 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P. (2001), “The Strategy-Focused Organisation”. Boston, 
Harvard Business School Press. 
 
127 
 
Kothari, S.P., and Warner J.B. (2007), “Econometrics of Event Studies.” in: Handbook 
of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance Vol. I, (Elsevier/North-Holland), 
ed. B.E. Eckbo, Chapter 1, pp.3-36. 
 
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S. and Wysocki, P. D. (2009), “Do Managers Withhold Bad 
News?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 47 (1), pp.241-276. 
 
Lang, M. H., and Lundholm, R. J. (2000), “Discretionary Disclosure and Equity 
Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?” Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 17 (4), pp.623-662. 
 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2011), “When is a Liability not a Liability? Textual 
Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10-Ks”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 66, pp.35-65. 
 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2013), “IPO first day returns, offer price revisions, 
volatility and form S-1 language”. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109 (2), 
pp.307-326. 
 
Mayew, W. and Venkatachalam, M. (2012), “The Power of Voice: Managerial 
affective states and future firm performance”. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 67 (1), 
pp.1-43. 
 
Meek G. K., Roberts C. B. and Gray S. J., (1995), “Factors Influencing Voluntary 
Annual Disclosures by U.S., U.K., and Continental European Multinational 
Corporations”. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26 (3), pp.555-572. 
 
Middleton, J. (2003), “The Ultimate Strategy Library”, Oxford, Capstone. 
 
128 
 
Miller, G. (2002), “Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure”. Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 40 (1), pp.173-204. 
 
Molly, M. (2004), “How, Do Investor Assess the Credibility of Management 
Disclosures”. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 18 (3), pp.185-204. 
 
Neuhierl, A., Scherbina, A. and Schlusche B. (2013), “Market Reaction to Corporate 
Press Releases”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 48 (4), pp.1207-
1240. 
 
Porter, M., E. (1996) “What is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74 (6), pp 
61-78. 
 
Reuters News (2010), “UPDATE 3-Apple Unveils $499 "iPad", Bets on New Device 
Class”. Retrieved 15 January, 2012, from Factiva database. 
 
Rumelt, R. (2011), “Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters”. 
New York: Crown Business. 
 
Tetlock, P. C. (2007), “Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in 
the Stock Market”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, pp.1139-1168. 
 
Tetlock, P. C., Saar-Tsechansky, M. and Macskassy, S. (2008), “More than Words: 
Quantifying Language to Measure Firms Fundamentals”. Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, 
pp.1437-1467. 
 
 
129 
 
Tsao, A. (2002), “When a Stock’s Rating and Target Collide” Bloomberg Business 
Week. Accessed on February 21, 2015, Available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020425_3101.htm. 
 
Twedt, B. and Rees. L. (2012), “Reading between the Lines: An Empirical 
Examination of Qualitative Attributes of Financial Analysts’ Reports”. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 31 (1), pp.1-21. 
 
White, H. (1980), “A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity”. Econometrica, Vol. 48, pp.817-838. 
 
Whittington, R., Douglas, B. Y. and Ahn, K. (2010), “Just Talk? Strategic Plan 
Announcements and Market Reactions”. Working Paper, Centre for Corporate 
Reputation, Said Business School, University of Oxford, Academy of Management 
Annual Conference, Texas, USA. 
 
 
